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Of the World Trade Court’s Burden 
 
 
Sungjoon Cho♠ 
 
 
“We are not final because we 
are infallible; but we are 
infallible only because we are 
final.”1 
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Introduction  
 
Ever since the historic launch of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its 
dispute resolution tribunal, the World Trade Court (the Court),2 has commanded both 
attention and admiration from its users and commentators. This crown jewel of the WTO 
system has attracted over 350 cases in the past decade.3 The Court has addressed three 
times more cases than the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has done during the latter’s 
half-century of existence.4  
 
Ironically, however, the Court’s magnetism has been a mixed blessing. In addition 
to conventional trade issues, such as tariffs and subsidies, it has also attracted high profile 
cases characterized by scientific controversies and socio-cultural sensitivities. The Court’s 
decisions on these sensitive cases have often caused resentment from some groups, 
besides losing parties. For example, the Court’s Hormones decision in 1998, which struck 
down the European Union (EU)’s ban on the importation of hormone-treated beef from 
the United States on the ground that the ban was adopted with no scientific evidence,5 
irked many governments and consumer organizations which accused the Court of forcing 
them to accept low regulatory standards in the name of science.6 Four years later, the EU 
resurrected the same ban under a new scientific justification.7 
 
Beneath this disapproval of the Court lies an image of a Dworkinian Hercules 
which capriciously renders its own answers on risks and science.8 In judging which party 
should win the case, this Hercules assesses parties’ arguments and evidence on risks and 
regulatory responses through a technical rule labeled the “burden of proof” (BOP). In the 
traditional approach used under public international law, the BOP is mainly the parties’ 
burden: any party which invokes a certain fact bears the burden of proving its veracity 
                                                 
2 In this Article, I use “World Trade Court” or “Court” only in a metaphoric sense. Technically, 
the WTO tribunal, i.e., a panel or the Appellate Body, is not a court per se and its decision constitutes a 
“recommendation” to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), art. 19. Nonetheless, it is still a “judicial” or at least “quasi-judicial” organ which 
performs an adjudicative function.  
3 World Trade Organization List of Disputed Cases, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).   
4 List of Cases Brought Before the International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
5 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶197, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
6 DEBI BARKER & JERRY MANDER, INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
GLOBAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM? 26 (1999). 
7 See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22. ARIZ J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 114 
(2005). 
8 See generally RONALD DOWRKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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(actori incumbit probation9). This position was affirmed in an early WTO case, Shirts and 
Blouses.10 Therefore, for strategic reasons, parties have been preoccupied with the 
allocation of the BOP. A complaining party tends to argue that a defending (regulating) 
party’s regulation can be invoked only as an “exception” to a contrary obligation so that 
the latter should prove necessary facts for the exception. On the other hand, the 
defending party tends to argue that it has a “right” to regulate in the first place so that the 
former should prove conflicting facts which may rebut this presumption.  
 
However, how Hercules weaves its own (right) answers on risks and science, and 
who it will pick in the end as a winner is related only remotely to the BOP as defined as 
the parties’ burden, i.e., the allocation of the BOP (who to prove). No matter how hard a 
party attempts to strategize this aspect of the BOP in the proceeding, it is the Court 
which determines such allocation via interpretation. Furthermore, even if who to prove is 
determined, the final outcome of the case hinges eventually on those elements which the 
Court requires parties to prove (what to prove) as well as whether the Court approves that 
a party has discharged its BOP and allows the burden to shift to the other party (whether 
to prove). Therefore, the BOP is in fact the Court’s hermeneutical burden.  
 
Then, what has been the rationale, or a driving force, behind the Court’s 
interpretive stance on these BOP issues, such as who to prove, what to prove and whether 
to prove, in those disputes regarding risks and regulation? This Article argues that it has 
been a “judicialization of science”: the Court, with its judicial authority, employs the BOP 
in a way which defines and constructs its own version of science11 to deliver a definite 
answer to litigants. Yet, as long as the Court plays the role of Hercules by handing down 
actuarial justice on issues of high controversy, such as risks and science, whatever 
decision it makes will hardly satisfy the parties concerned, at least the losing party, and 
thus never fully resolving their disputes. This dichotomy between the Court’s 
transcendental judgment and parties’ obsession with their own versions of science is a 
fundamental factor which threatens both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Court. 
Parties, and observers, will neither respect nor fully implement such decisions. 
 
Against this depressing backdrop, this Article explores a new hermeneutical path 
by which the Court can avoid this potential legitimacy crisis. If the Court’s own answer 
(substantive justice) cannot put an end to parties’ antimonial struggle, the Court should 
contemplate guiding parties to discover the solution between them via constructive 
regulatory dialogue. In other words, the Court, instead of throwing out its own “right 
answer” in front of already dogmatic parties, might encourage them to fulfill their 
dialectical dialogue through talking to, deliberating with, and enlightening each other. 
This nuanced judicial posture can greatly mitigate any unnecessary adversarial tensions, 
                                                 
9 See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 327, 334 (1953); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 15-16 (June 15). 
10 Appellate Body Report, US-Wool Shirts and Blouses from United States-Measures Affecting Imports 
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India India, 15, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997). 
11 In this Article, the notion of science is a broad one, including not only natural science but also 
social science, such as public policy, sociology, psychology, and economics. 
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which will in turn secure a certain space for accommodation or recognition of different 
regulatory positions.12  
 
The Court can achieve this new goal by transforming its current substantive 
hermeneutics over the BOP into a “procedural” one. The Court can lead parties to 
present different probative evidence, i.e., evidence substantiating the procedural integrity 
of a measure, from the conventional one, i.e., evidence adduced to prove that it is 
scientifically valid. For example, if a defending (regulating) party has failed to respond to 
a complaining (exporting) party’s inquiries on the former’s new health regulation which is 
negatively affecting the latter’s exports, the Court may establish a presumption against 
the former that its measure was adopted without valid scientific justification. This 
jurisprudence will motivate the former to engage with the latter in good faith to avoid any 
adverse inferences. 
 
A procedural turn by the Court would, in a sense, be redemptive to disputants 
because it would engage them in a dialectical bond of regulatory discourse and thus 
immunize them from any zero-sum ruling, which would widen their initial antimonial 
stance, rather than narrowing it.13 In this procedural approach, a Court’s decision on risk 
regulations14 is inherently provisional. Even after the decision, parties may still be able to 
reach a compromise as they naturally engage in further regulatory dialogue as the losing 
party complies with such procedural decisions whose remedies are also procedural. 
Critically, the Court does not provide any “final normative standpoint.”15 Instead, it de 
facto remands the original case to parties with nuanced instructions to communicate with 
each other in an attempt to overcome their own socio-cultural prejudices on risks and 
regulation.16 This hermeneutical turn to a procedural discipline in fact corresponds with 
the original normative orientation of those rules which govern risk regulations, i.e., 
                                                 
12 In this context, Gaskin observed that “[t]he strategic power of polarized argumentation will 
always deliver short-term benefits to successful advocates, thereby strengthening popular reliance on 
transcendental reasoning. Over the longer term, however, dialectical reasoning offers everyone a less 
divisive accommodation with arguments-from-ignorance by limiting their authority to restricted domains 
within a broader conceptual horizon.” GASKIN, supra note_, at 240. 
13 “Rather than bringing conflicts to a peaceful result, contemporary tribunals appear to sharpen 
existing divisions, even as jurisprudential authority descends from its transcendental abode and shapes the 
everyday world according to the demands of litigation.”  GASKIN, supra note_, at 208. 
14 This article focuses on risk regulations under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
Article XX (General Exceptions), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure (SPS) which require governments to assess, determine and manage 
those risk-related regulatory challenges. Those regulations vary in accordance with different types of 
societal risks, including human health risks and other risks from illicit practices, such as smuggling and tax 
evasion. Those risk regulations somehow involve scientific investigations in that regulators weigh in risks 
and effectiveness of policy options by means of objective disciplines, such as toxicology, medical science, 
engineering, economics, and public health studies. Finally, a disclaimer: this article addresses the BOP 
issues related to risk-related regulations in the areas of health, safety, environment, and other public policies. 
It does not deal with the BOP issues in other areas, such as antidumping law, which have a quite different 
set of rules and jurisprudence. 
15 GASKIN, supra note_, at 242. 
16 GASKIN, supra note_, at 264. 
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GATT Article XX and the SPS Agreement. The preambular language (chapeau) of 
GATT Article XX focuses on the manner in which a measure is applied. Also, obligations 
under the SPS Agreement, such as the risk assessment requirement, focus more on 
regulatory procedures than on substantive, specific levels of protection.17  
 
This Article unfolds in the following sequence: Part I launches the analysis by 
observing that the conventional notion of the BOP in international trade law is the 
parties’ burden. Which one should prove disputed facts has been a subject of serious 
arguments by parties, which have regarded this issue as a determinative factor to the 
outcome of their cases. In contrast, Part II shifts the focus from parties to the Court and 
attempts to conceptualize the BOP as the Court’s hermeneutical burden under which the 
Court must determine who to prove, what to prove and whether to prove before it finally 
picks the winner in each case. Part III then unearths the Court’s veiled agenda beneath 
the current exercise of its burden. It defines the agenda as “judicialization of science” and 
argues that the Court plays the role of a Hercules who delivers right answers once and for 
all on controversial risk-related disputes under its judicial authority. Part IV criticizes this 
substantive finality which the Court pursues: it not only precipitates jurisprudential 
incoherencies but also eventually undermines the Court’s legitimacy. As a solution, Part 
V suggests that the Court should interpretively reconstruct relevant provisions from a 
procedural standpoint, and thus motivate parties to engage in regulatory dialogue and 
cooperation. It concludes that the Court should articulately speak to parties through this 
new hermeneutics. 
 
 
I. Parties’ Burden: The Conventional Approach on the Burden of Proof 
in International Trade Law 
 
The panel practice under the GATT centers on the assignment issue (who to 
prove) in administering the BOP.18 Under the GATT system, panels developed a BOP 
doctrine despite the lack of any textual ground.19 Under this doctrine, a complaining 
party must demonstrate that a defending party had violated certain provisions of the 
Agreement.20 Also, a party invoking an exception bears the burden of proving that it had 
                                                 
17 David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An 
Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 865, 925-26 (2000). 
18 See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36. VA. J. INT’ L. 379, 434 n.318 (1996) (viewing that 
“burden of proof is used in the sense of assigning which party is responsible for proving or disproving a 
proposition rather than in the sense of what ‘degree of proof’ that party is required to satisfy”). But see Vern 
R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, 
Science Policy, and Fact-finding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 290-96 (1998) 
(distinguishing between the issue of allocation of proof burdens and standard of proof). 
19 Nichols, supra note _, at 434. 
20 See e.g., Canada/Japan--Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, 36 Supp. 
BISD 167, 198 (1989). See also Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A 
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met all the requirements of that exception.21 Philip Nichols observed that GATT panels 
took this assignment of the proof burdens on exceptions so seriously that “changing it 
would be tantamount to renegotiating the obligations and benefits of the Contracting 
Parties.”22 In articulating the doctrine, GATT panels highlighted that it must be parties’, 
not the panel’s, task to demonstrate and prove their arguments and positions.23 
 
The WTO inherited from GATT this conventional approach on the BOP which 
highlights the allocation of the initial burden of proof, i.e., who bears the proof burdens in 
the first place.24 The AB in Shirts and Blouses delivered a paradigmatic ruling in this issue. 
The AB held that: 
 
[I]t is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law 
and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the 
party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a 
particular claim or defense. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to 
raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to 
the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut 
the presumption.25 
 
This finding has frequently been cited ever since in subsequent cases involving the 
BOP issues.26 The WTC often begins its ruling on the BOP by referring to the finding. 
                                                                                                                                                 
GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1420-21 (1994) (noting that 
the explicit terms of GATT Article XX requires defendant governments to raise justification). 
21  See e.g., United States--Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, 39 Supp. BISD 206, 282 
(1992); Canada--Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, 36 Supp. BISD 68, 84 (1989); Canada-- 
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 30 Supp. BISD 140, 164 (1984). 
22 Nichols, supra note _, at 435.  
23  Nichols, supra note _, at 434; See EEC--Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain 
Products from Hong Kong, 30 Supp. BISD 129, 138 (1983). 
24 See Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195, 
1248 (1998) (regarding the burden of proof issue as whether a complaining party always bears the burden of 
proof in the WTO dispute proceeding or whether such burden may shift to a defending party under certain 
conditions).  
25 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses 
from India, pt. IV, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997).  Some commentators distinguish between an initial 
allocation of BOP (global BOP) and a shifted one (local BOP). Regarding views that the BOP is never 
shifted, see Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof, and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Bears the 
Burden?, , 252-53 (1998) (hereinafter Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion) (viewing that a 
complainant’s duty to establish a prima facie case subject to a subsequent rebut by a defendant does not 
regard the burden of proof but the evaluation of evidence and therefore the initial allocation of burden is 
never shifted); Walker, supra note _, at 295 (arguing that against the burden of persuasion is never shifted 
onto the defending party, even after the complainant has made its prima facie case). 
 26  See e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), ¶40, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-
Trade Description of Sardines, ¶27, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002). 
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Such habitual citation by subsequent tribunals conferred the finding a certain aura of 
authority and thus established an observable jurisprudence in this area.  
 
Then why have parties taken the initial allocation of the BOP so seriously? One 
might reasonably speculate that an initial allocation of proof burdens would eventually 
determine the outcome of a case since it reflects a normative configuration of treaty 
obligation, e.g., whether a provision offers an independent right or a mere exception, 
between a regulating party and the other affected party.27 Therefore, a complaining party, 
like India in Shirts and Blouses, would resist bearing the burden of proving that a 
defending party, the United States in this case, has violated WTO norms in the first place, 
but rather prefer to have the defending party bear the burden of proving that the latter’s 
measure could be justified as an exception to certain general obligations. 
 
Treaty texts tend to play an initial, albeit provisional, key role in this normative 
configuration between parties. By specifying rights and obligations of parties, treaty texts 
establish various “presumptions” on one side and in turn require the other side to 
overturn (refute) such presumptions by proving the opposite facts. For this reason, an 
initial allocation of BOP is tantamount to declaring an opening position which may be 
advantageous to one party vis-à-vis the other. Moreover, if an initial burden of proof 
borne by one party, be it a complaining party or a defending party, is so heavy that the 
party is likely to fail to discharge its proof burden, such allocation of BOP tends to decide 
the outcome of a case. Thus, in an adversarial battle of litigation, this original position 
may be “prominent,” in particular when a dispute involves complicated factual aspects 
such as risks and science.28 
 
For example, the Cartagena Protocol is said to create a presumption of danger and 
thus shift the burden of proving that living modified organisms (LMOs) are safe to an 
innovator (exporter).29 Thus, an importing country, i.e., a regulating country, holds a 
right to regulate over the importation of the LMOs. Under this normative configuration, 
an importing (regulating) country’s measure will always prevail, if an exporting country’s 
burden to prove its LMOs’ safety is insurmountable. Likewise, the SPS Agreement 
arguably establishes a presumption that a WTO member has a right to set its own 
appropriate level of sanitary protection, even though such level departs from international 
standards. As a result, the other party (exporting country) would have to bear the burden 
                                                 
27 Cf. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burden of Quality: The Burden of Proof and Presumption in Indian 
and American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 92 (1999) (observing that certain modern Indian laws 
attempted to employ presumptions and burdens of proof as a “tool for countering the traditional normative 
system’s resistance to the implementation of the new legal regime”). 
28 Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in 
the First Three SPS Disputes, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 641, 659 (1999).  
29 Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 29 Jan 2000, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3 (June 29, 2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp; Doaa 
Abdel Motaal, Is the World Trade Organization Anti-Precaution?, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 489-90 (2005). 
See also Paulette Stenzel, Why and How the World Trade Organization Must Promote Environmental Protection, 
13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 44 (2002) (contending that the WTO should espouse the precautionary 
principle and thus impose the burden of proof on manufacturers to demonstrate the safety of a product). 
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of proving that the importing country’s measure is without scientific justification. 
However, under the GATT structure, the importing country, not the exporting country, 
should demonstrate as an exception that such regulation is necessary to protect human 
health since GATT is premised on free trade obligations by members, not on their rights 
to regulate.30 
 
 
II. The World Trade Court’s Burden: Reconstructing the Burden of 
Proof in International Trade Law 
 
A. From Parties’ Burden to the Court’s Burden 
 
As discussed above, the conventional BOP rule under the GATT/WTO 
jurisprudence imposes an initial BOP on a party invoking certain facts and arguments in 
its favor. In most cases, the BOP is borne to a complaining party which should 
demonstrate, or establish a prima facie case, that a defending party has violated 
GATT/WTO rules. As for exceptions or affirmative defenses, a defending party bears the 
burden of proving that its measure, although provisionally WTO-inconsistent, 
nevertheless falls within the rubric of one of the exceptions and thus eventually WTO-
consistent. Therefore, under the conventional approach, the BOP denotes parties’ burden. 
 
Accordingly, in any adversarial form of adjudication, including the WTO dispute 
settlement system, the issue of the initial allocation of the BOP appears a momentous 
matter at first glance. Theoretically, if there was insufficient evidence which substantiates 
neither party’s position or if both parties’ evidence is in a state of equipoise in their 
probative force, the BOP, like a tie-breaker, decides who should win.31 In other words, the 
BOP may stand for a risk of non-persuasion. In addition, a party which bears the BOP 
should invest in a substantial amount of time and effort in adducing relevant and 
necessary evidence in the first place. This initiation cost may be disadvantageous in a 
strategic sense under an adversarial proceeding. 
 
Under these circumstances, the BOP may be prone to abuse and manipulation. 
Parties may be tempted to craft their claims in a way that would evade those issues as to 
which they would not desire to bear the proof burden and force the opposing party to 
raise and prove those facts.32 One commentator observed that there is a “genuine risk” 
                                                 
30  See e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, 22-23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996);  Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting 
Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 14-15, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997); Panel Report, 
United States–Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶5.27, WT/DS186/R (Jan. 12, 2000).   
31 Michael Lennard, Navigating the Stars: Interpreting WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 17, 84 
(2002) 
32 Michelle T. Grando, Allocating Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 615, 629 
(2006). 
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that parties do nothing in the proceedings but claim that the other party should persuade 
the panel.33 
 
On the other hand, however, it is eventually the Court which decides who should 
win. The initial allocation of the BOP (who to prove) alone seldom decides the outcome 
of a case. This issue may be of great importance under the common law system where 
judicial interventions are seriously curtailed by the existence of jury and litigant 
autonomy, even in case of evidential incompleteness.34 Yet, its relative significance tends 
to wane in international tribunals since these tribunals hold a wider range of discretion in 
the proceeding and emphasize a collective obligation by parties to cooperate with each 
other in presenting evidence before the tribunals.35 The WTC is no exception to this 
trend in that it enjoys wide discretion in fact-finding, including the authority to summon 
expert witnesses.36 
 
As an ostensible departure from the law and economic analysis, the BOP rule 
under the WTO system does not reflect “respective difficulties that may possibly be 
encountered by the complainant and the respondent in collecting information to prove a 
case.”37 Instead, winning or losing a case hinges critically on how the Court itself 
interprets both facts and law in proof-related areas, i.e., whether to prove and what to 
prove. It is the Court which weighs each evidence and determines whether and how 
much a party has proved to discharge its BOP as well as when to shift the proof burden to 
the other party. The Court enjoys “a margin of discretion in assessing the value of the 
evidence, and the weight to be ascribed to that evidence.”38 This discretion is immune 
from an appeal.39 The Court may even consider the expert opinions to determine whether 
                                                 
33 Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note _, at  228-29.   
34 See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 621, 640 
(1998).  
35 Grando, supra note_, at 616 n.2.. See also MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED 
ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 119 (1996); “It is often said that the 
idea of peaceful settlement of disputes before international tribunals is largely based on the premise of 
cooperation of the litigating parties.” Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note_, at 234 (quoting 
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel, and Other Items,  
¶6.40, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997)). See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World 
Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, in 
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995–2003 499, 511(Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann eds., 2004) (observing that the issue of the burden of proof has seldom been raised in the 
European Court of Justice). 
36 But see Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe’s Evolving Regulatory Strategy for GMOs-The 
Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 317, 346 (2000) (arguing 
that a panel’s use of expert witnesses in the WTO proceeding should be limited to convincing themselves of 
an already proved prima facie case, but not be extended to substantiating such facts as were not presented by 
parties). 
37  Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, ¶281, 
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002). 
38 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products 
Containing Asbestos, ¶161, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
39  Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶261, 
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (“The Panel's consideration and weighing of the evidence in support of 
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a prima facie case has been established.40 Likewise, it is the Court which decides what 
should be proved, i.e., the question of “what the importing Member must demonstrate.”41  
 
For example, in Gambling both the defendant (the United States) and the 
complainant (Antigua) appealed on the ground that the panel erred in its treatment of 
BOP under GATS Article XIV (General Exceptions). Interestingly, both the U.S. and 
Antigua argued that the panel, in deciding whether the United States’ ban on the online 
gambling was an “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” failed to base its ruling on the 
other party’s arguments and evidence adduced in terms of Article XIV, but instead 
“recycled” previous arguments and evidence submitted by both parties under different 
provisions.42  
 
To each party this recycling by the panel is improper since it unduly advantaged 
the other party. Antigua viewed that the recycling permitted the United States to 
discharge the latter’s initial burden of making a prima facie case under the exception 
clause (Article XIV) when the latter failed to do so.43 On the other hand, the United 
States submitted that the same practice (recycling) “constructed a rebuttal” under the 
chapeau (arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination) in favor of Antigua when Antigua 
failed to do so.44 However, the Appellate Body (AB) endorsed the panel’s discretion to 
reuse those arguments and evidence previously adduced under different yet still relevant 
provisions.45  This overarching evidentiary rule, although it may contribute to judicial 
economy, tends to override the initial allocation of BOP by allowing the panel to 
effectively relieve a certain party of its BOP.  
 
I am not arguing here that the initial allocation of burden of proof (who to prove) 
is inconsequential. It is still important. As Henrik Horn and Joseph Weiler aptly observed, 
it will “ceteris paribus affect the probability that the different parties win” by burdening one 
party over the other.46 Likewise, it will shape Members’ behavior in various ways, 
including their resource spending in the proceeding as well as decision-making as to 
whether to launch litigation at all and/or when to settle.47 Nonetheless, such determinant 
power of the allocation of BOP tends to dramatically decrease if the very “ceteris paribus” 
(other things being equal) condition is not met. In other words, if the Court destabilizes 
                                                                                                                                                 
Canada's claims relates to its assessment of the facts and, therefore, falls outside the scope of appellate 
review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.”) 
40 Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on the Imports of Agriculture, Textile, and 
Industrial Products, ¶142, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999). 
41 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses 
from India, 14-15, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997) 
42 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling , ¶¶ 
277-79, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
43 Id.  at ¶278. 
44 Id. at ¶279. 
45 Id. at ¶¶ 287-88. 
46 Henrik Horn and Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines: 
Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002 262 (H. Horn and P.C. Mavroidis eds. 2005). 
47 Id. 
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this unique condition by setting the subsequent terms of parties’ evidentiary tasks, i.e., 
whether to prove and what to prove, the initial allocation (locus) of BOP, i.e., who to 
prove, may not matter much after all. 
 
For example, in Hormones, even if the AB viewed that “the Panel mistakenly 
required that the European Communities take on the burden of proof that its measures 
related to the hormones involved here, except MGA, are based on a risk assessment,” and 
therefore determined that “the United States and Canada have to make a prima facie 
case that these measures are not based on a risk assessment,” the AB still found that “the 
United States and Canada, although not required to do so by the Panel, did, in fact, make 
this prima facie case that the SPS measures related to the hormones involved here, except 
MGA, are not based on a risk assessment.”48 
 
More saliently, the AB in Sardines addressed the effectiveness and appropriateness 
of an international standard (Codex Stan 94) on the labeling of Sardines under the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).49 The EC’s Regulation monopolized 
the use of term “Sardine” in favor of those sardines caught in the European sea in the 
name of consumer protection, while the Codex standard explicitly endorsed a much more 
liberal, generic use of the term. Therefore, the labeling of Peruvian Sardines was 
prohibited by the EC Regulation, which departed from the Codex Stan 94 permitting 
such labeling. Article 2.4 of TBT requires Members to follow a relevant international 
standard unless it is ineffective and inappropriate in achieving putative regulatory goals. 
Who should then bear the initial burden of proving that the Codex standard is still 
ineffective and inappropriate?  
 
The Panel viewed that the defendant (the EC) should, while the AB viewed that 
it should rest on the complainant (Peru). The AB, in tandem with its similar ruling in 
Hormones, emphasized that Members enjoy regulatory autonomy which would include 
even a right to disregard a relevant international standard if it believes that such standard 
is ineffective and inappropriate. Therefore, according to the AB, Peru should have proved 
that Codex Stan 94 was in fact effective and appropriate to fulfill the EC’s regulatory 
goals. At first blush, Peru’s BOP seems quite heavy since it should produce positive 
(apodeicdic) evidence which would substantiate that Codex Stan 94 could fully address 
European consumers’ concerns for fraud and confusion over sardines. 
 
Nonetheless, the AB declared that Peru did discharge its apparently formidable 
BOP by applying rather light evidentiary criteria. Both the panel and the AB endorsed 
Peru’s negative (apagogical) evidence which illustrated that “it has not been established” 
that most European consumers “have always associated the common name ‘sardines’ 
                                                 
48 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶197 n.180, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).  
49  Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶284-91, 
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002). 
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exclusively with Sardina pilchardus” which are those sardines harvested in the European 
sea and thus familiar to European consumers.50  
 
This type of evidence seems quite insufficient to discharge Peru’s seemingly heavy 
BOP since there could still be some confused European consumers out there and the EC 
might pursue a zero-tolerance policy over consumer protection, as it did in Hormones.51 In 
other words, the AB’s hermeneutics on this low evidentiary threshold in proving whether 
an international standard is efficient or appropriate amounts to a second-guessing of 
Members’ level of regulatory protection. The AB insinuated that given the regulatory 
environment in which to its belief no significant level of risks from consumer confusion 
over sardines existed, the Codex Stan 94 would be good enough after all. This posture 
runs in the face of the AB’s previous allocation of BOP in favor of Members’ regulatory 
autonomy, which led Peru, not the EC, to prove the value of Codex Stan 94. Accordingly, 
the AB’s reversal of the panel’s allocation of BOP (who to prove) from a defendant (the 
EC) to a complainant (Peru) in the spirit of regulatory autonomy failed to deliver any 
impact due to the AB’s subsequent prescription of a low evidentiary threshold in 
discharging Peru’s BOP (whether to prove).52 
 
The Court’s subsequent dilution of any impacts which the initial allocation of the 
BOP might have delivered through lessening the evidentiary threshold, standards of proof, 
in Sardines testifies that the BOP issues are “hermeneutical” in nature. It is in the Court’s 
interpretive discretion,53 or more critically, prudence, to resolve who to prove, whether to 
prove and what to prove in each dispute on a case-by-case basis. Even the conventional 
focal point, i.e., who to prove, is subject to this interpretive discretion because in most 
cases the allocation of an initial BOP is not obvious from the text itself and often requires 
the Court’s creative construction. This interpretive task concerning the BOP eventually 
becomes the Court’s own responsibility or burden under the DSU in that the task falls 
within the realm of “an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of 
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.”54 In the end, how the Court 
discharges this burden determines not only the destiny of a given case but also the 
legitimacy of the Court.  
 
                                                 
50 Id. at ¶290 (underlining added). 
51 See Horn & Weiler, supra note_, at 272. 
52 See Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 
31(2004) (viewing that the AB’s reversal of the Sardine panel’s ruling on the allocation of the burden of 
proof “had no effect on the outcome of the case”). 
53 Cf. Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note _, at  227 (referring to “a tool which is 
particularly attractive to adjudicators: clouded in an air of procedural neutrality but, by the same token, 
falling to a considerable extent within the quasi-discretionary powers of the panel”). 
54 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 112, 120 (1994) (hereinafter DSU). But cf. Walker, supra note_ . 
(submitting that the Appellate Body should impose on panels a minimum requirement of “rational 
inference,” defined as “minimal evidence that any reasonable person would consider necessary to support 
such a finding,” namely a “preponderance standard of proof”). 
As of March 7, 2007 
 13 
This hermeneutical burden appears more salient to the WTC than to domestic 
courts. International agreements, such as the SPS Agreement, are essentially a product of 
compromise after a series of negotiations, which expounds the inherent ambiguity of their 
texts.55 To project a WTO Member’s concrete (contextualized) behavior (an alleged 
violation) onto these abstract (de-contextualized) texts necessitates panels’ or the AB’s 
creative (re-) construction of these texts beyond mechanical application of them. 
Although it is WTO members themselves which ultimately (re-) interpret them in a 
legislative sense,56 to resolve a dispute through the aforementioned (re-) construction is 
reserved to a panel or the AB. 
 
Finally, the court-oriented approach to the BOP proposed here is more amenable 
to the practical reality than the conventional, party-oriented approach. The BOP, in a 
conventional narrow sense, only concerns facts, not law. Matters of law are decided 
exclusively by judges (jura novit curia). Parties bear no BOP as to issues of law even 
though they often present legal arguments in their favor.57 However, in practice the line 
between law and facts is blurred. Factum probandum is often enmeshed in legal claims and 
arguments. Under the court-oriented approach, the Court tends to correspond better 
with this blurred distinction since it may feel less compelled to dichotomize facts and law 
for the purpose of the BOP. After all, the Court interprets both facts and law. 
 
 B. Three Hermeneutical Burdens of the Court 
 
1. Who to Prove  
 
As discussed above, parties may not predict precisely who will bear the proof 
burden in advance since it is basically a matter of the Court’s interpretation.58 For 
example, Article 5, paragraph 10 of the SPS Agreement establishes that an SPS measure 
conforming to international standards is presumed to be consistent with relevant SPS 
provisions. One might interpret this provision as imposing the BOP on a regulating 
                                                 
55 See notably John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO, 39 GERMAN Y. B. 
INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (viewing that “the decision-making and voting procedures of the WTO, although 
much improved over the GATT, still leave much to be desired”); John H. Jackson, International Economic 
Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000) (viewing that “treaties are often an 
awkward albeit necessary method of designing institutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they 
do not solve many problems”). 
56 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1148 (1994) (hereinafter WTO Agreement) (“The Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this 
Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”). 
57 Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note _, at  242. 
58 Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195, 1252 
(1998). 
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(defending) party in case it fails to enjoy such presumption.59 In this line, the Hormones 
panel ruled that the EC should demonstrate that its ban on hormoned beef would still be 
necessary, although the ban departed from the Codex standard, since the standard was 
not good enough for the purpose of the EC’s regulation. In other words, the existence of 
the presumption would construct members’ duty to follow international standards under 
Article 3.1 as a general obligation and an opt-out clause under Article 3.3 as an 
exception.60 
 
However, this position was patently rejected by the AB, which instead interpreted 
the same provision in a diametrically opposite fashion. The AB attempted to legitimize its 
opposite interpretation from a textual ground, although a reasonable inference from the 
text (Articles 3.1 and 3.3) would lead to the panel’s original interpretation. The AB 
simply renounced the general obligation/exception relationship in Articles 3.1 and 3.3, 
upholding members’ regulatory autonomy which may even encompass a right to depart 
from international standards despite an explicit obligation to follow those standards under 
Article 3.1.61 The AB held that: 
 
We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon 
themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation 
by mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines and 
recommendations.62 
 
To the AB, harmonization of SPS measures through international standards under 
Article 3.1 merely embodies an aspiration, not a legal obligation, which is “yet to be 
realized in the future.”63 
 
Critically, these diverging interpretive postures between the panel and the AB are 
attributable to more than textual grounds. They represent different institutional 
objectives and purposes (teloi) which the panel and the AB project to the text whenever 
they interpret it. These different teloi reflect different Zeitgeists shaping the development 
of international trade law.  
 
One of the principal criticisms directed to the GATT was its embedded pro-trade 
bias. Founded against the historical background of economic balkanization in the 
interwar period, the original teleology of the GATT was free trade. Although it did 
recognize certain compromise by permitting non-trade values, such as protection of 
human health or the environment, these values were upheld only as “exceptions” under 
                                                 
59  See John J. Barcelo III, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment-The GATT and 
Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755, 774 (1994). 
60 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
¶¶8.86-8.87, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997). 
61  Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶¶169-171, WT/DS26/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
62 Id. at  ¶165 (emphasis original). 
63 Id. (emphasis original). 
As of March 7, 2007 
 15 
Article XX. In other words, these values were only secondary to the main value of free 
trade, represented by basic obligations, such as the National Treatment principle.64  
 
Furthermore, these values were very hard to recognize in a practical sense since 
exceptions are meant to be interpreted narrowly, not broadly. In fact, in the entire GATT 
history, not a single non-trade value was upheld under Article XX.65 Under this pro-trade 
bias which structurally downgrades non-trade values as exceptions, a burden of proving 
that any given regulation is legitimate (non-protectionist) and necessary rests on a 
regulating country. One might justify this position by observing that any regulation is 
presumed to be protectionist since any government tends to favor its domestic producers 
in designing the regulation.66 
 
Unsurprisingly, this structural and empirical pro-trade bias of the GATT regime 
drew much criticism from both environmentalists and domestic regulators. A number of 
NGOs have vehemently attacked the neo-liberal mantra of free trade-cum-globalization 
which they believe undermines more paramount values such as environmental protection 
or social justice. In addition, the rise of the modern welfare state, which is expected to 
respond to citizens’ heightened demands for better social hygiene, turned a once 
deregulatory ethos to a re-regulatory one. This elevated recognition of domestic 
regulations naturally altered the political dynamics around them. In the past, risk 
regulations were mostly regarded as technical and professional issues which concerned a 
narrow epistemic community of scientists and policymakers.67 However, once highlighted 
and thus politicized, risk regulations have become everybody’s business.68 
 
Out of this novel pro-regulation ethos, negotiators in the Uruguay Round created 
the SPS/TBT Agreement which escalated those non-trade values once regarded as mere 
exceptions under GATT Article XX to an autonomous “right” to regulate. The TBT 
preamble recognizes that “no country should be prevented from taking measures 
necessary . . .  for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the 
environment”69; SPS Article 2.1 specifies that “Members have the right to take sanitary and 
                                                 
64 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF 
THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003). 
65 See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and the Regulatory 
State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant 
Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD 
TRADE LAW 142 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2000). 
66  Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and the Environment: How Should WTO Panels Review 
Environmental Regulations Under GATT III and XX?, 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 441, 449 (1996). 
67 See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization 
and International Organizations: The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant 
Protection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 27, 28 
(1998). 
68 Id., at 52. 
69 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A, the WTO Agreement, supra note_, pmbl. 
(hereinafter TBT).  
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phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health.”70 
 
Silhouetted against this new ethos valuing regulatory autonomy of member 
countries, the AB would put members’ right to regulate before voluntary international 
standards, even though the SPS envisions harmonization around these standards. This 
value system eventually led the AB to reverse the otherwise plausible interpretation by 
the Hormones and Sardines panels which imposed on regulating parties the initial burden 
of proving that these standards were scientifically unjustified or ineffective/inappropriate 
to achieve their regulatory goals, and instead required the complaining parties to prove 
that these standards were supported by science and effective/appropriate.71  
 
2. What to Prove  
 
The second burden of the Court on the BOP is to decide what parties should 
prove to discharge their BOP. The Court’s interpretive orientation in this matter is often 
embodied in certain doctrinal tests, e.g., three- or four-prong tests. By designing these 
tests, the Court exercises its hermeneutical power in a way which steers parties’ 
adversarial battle to the direction that it chooses. This aspect of BOP was first raised by 
the AB in Shirts and Blouses. The AB viewed that: 
 
[W]e consider the question of what the importing Member must demonstrate 
at the time of its determination. . . . In the context of the GATT 1994 and 
the WTO Agreement, precisely how much and precisely what kind of 
evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily 
vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.72 
 
Although this aspect of BOP has not been salient, at least explicitly, the Court 
relied heavily on it in moving the proceeding forward. For example, the Hormones panel 
required the EC to demonstrate that it actually conducted a risk assessment by itself, 
proceduralizing the duty to assess risks.73 However, the AB rejected this procedural aspect 
of risk assessment obligation, leaving only its substantive part. Therefore, the EC only had 
to demonstrate that there existed a rational relationship between its measure and a risk 
assessment.74 Under this ruling, the EC could have even outsourced its risk assessment. 
                                                 
70 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the WTO Agreement, 
supra note_, art. 2.1 (hereinafter SPS). 
71 See John H. Knox, The Judicial Review of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 43-4 (2004). 
72 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses 
from India, pt. IV, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997) (emphasis added). 
73 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
¶1008, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997). 
74 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶193, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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Furthermore, according to the AB, a risk assessment need not be based on a mainstream 
scientific opinion: even a minority opinion is sufficient to justify the risk assessment.75  
 
These two interpretations by the AB, which were diametrically opposite to those 
of the panel, would have allowed the EC to rely on serendipitous studies which had come 
out only after it banned the hormone-treated beef.76 In other words, the AB’s liberal 
interpretation on the risk assessment requirement practically reduced the EC’s proof 
burdens because the EC would have easily cherry picked any novel yet controversial 
scientific opinions and presented them to discharge its proof burdens under Article 5.1.77 
 
3. Whether to Prove  
 
After the Court decides who should bear the BOP over disputed facts and what 
exactly parties should prove, its last interpretive task over the BOP is to determine 
whether parties bearing the proof burdens have actually discharged them. In other words, 
the Court should resolve the quantum (standard) of proof issue, i.e., how much evidence 
would be sufficient for a party to establish a prima facie case or to rebut the presumption 
that the initial prima facie case created in each case.78 
 
Therefore, when a complaining party claims that the other party violates Article 
2.2 of the SPS Agreement by maintaining its sanitary measure without scientific 
justification, the complaining party should prove that there is no rational relationship 
between the defending party’s measure and the scientific evidence. After all, the Court 
will decide whether such a relationship exists “on a case-by-case basis” taking into 
account the “particular circumstances of the case.”79 
 
Likewise, the Salmon panel originally found that the alleged Australian risk 
assessment on imported salmon (1996 Final Report) “addresse[d] and to some extent 
evaluate[d] a series of risk reduction factors, in particular, on a disease-by-disease basis.”80 
Accordingly, the panel assumed that the 1996 Final Report did “evaluate the likelihood 
of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases according to the SPS measures which 
might be applied” in compliance with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. However, the 
AB disagreed. It viewed that “some evaluation of the likelihood is not enough.” 81 
                                                 
75 Id. at ¶194. 
76 Reinhard Quick & Andreas Blüthner, Has the Appellate Body Erred?: An Appraisal and Criticism 
of the Ruling in the WTO Hormones Case, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L 603, 615 (1999). 
77 Id. at 618. 
78 Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note_, at 233. 
79  Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶84, WT/DS76/AB/R 
(Feb. 22 1999). 
80 Panel Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶8.91, WT/DS18/R (June 
12, 1998) (emphasis added). 
81 Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶134, 
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (emphasis original).  
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Therefore, how much evaluation needs to be shown to discharge the burden of proof 
regarding risk assessment depends totally on the Court’s interpretation under each 
circumstance.  
It was in this way that the AB in Gambling concluded that the U.S. demonstrated 
successfully the necessity of its ban on remote gambling, while Antigua failed to identify a 
reasonably available alternative measure which might have rebutted the U.S. position.82 
In the same vein, the AB in Korean Beef held that Korea failed to meet its burden of 
proving that alternatives to the dual retails system were not reasonably available.83 
 
Intriguingly, this onus of proof84 often plays a face-making function when the 
Court delivers its final decision. In any WTO dispute, a defending party loses for two 
reasons. First, it may lose in an “apodeicdic” fashion when the Court finds that its 
measure has violated, i.e., been inconsistent with, the WTO norms. Second, it may also 
lose in an “apagogical” fashion when the Court finds that it fails to demonstrate that its 
measure is not inconsistent with the WTO norms; to wit, it fails to discharge its burden of 
proving that its measure has not violated the WTO norms. The same logic applies to a 
situation in which a complaining party loses. It may lose when the Court finds that the 
measure in question is consistent with the WTO norms; it may also lose when the Court 
finds that the complaining party fails to establish its prima facie case that the measure is 
not consistent with the WTO norms. 
 
In both situations, the latter (apagogical) type of finding appears less damaging 
than the former to the losing party. While the former tends to blatantly reject a party’s 
claim, the latter tends to provisionally suspend the claim in a given dispute. In other 
words, in the former occasion, a losing party may not confidently make the same claim in 
any future dispute since it has been struck down. In the latter occasion, however, it may 
still make the same claim if it comes up with more or better pieces of evidence which may 
convince the Court. Therefore, the Court may gracefully mitigate the damage of the 
losing party by attributing its defeat not to a substantive reason (violation) but rather to a 
technical, procedural failure, even though such differentiation would not change the 
outcome of the case.  
 
4. A Cumulative Nature of Three Burdens 
 
These interpretive burdens that the Court bears in deciding who to prove, what to 
prove and whether to prove are interrelated and cumulative in nature, and should thus be 
understood in their entirety. No single aspect alone would be sufficient to capture true 
hermeneutical attributes of the BOP. 
                                                 
82 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling, 
¶326, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
83 Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶182, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000). 
84 Horn & Weiler, supra note_, at 261. 
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As discussed above, the conventional focal point in the BOP, i.e., the assignment 
issue (who to prove), may not be too critical to the outcome of the case because there are 
hardly any cases where the initial allocation of BOP solely determines the outcome of a 
litigation absent any prevailing evidence. Moreover, an alternating, ping pong-like shift of 
BOP between parties rarely happens. A panel or the AB simply interprets both facts and 
law based on a collection of arguments and evidence submitted by both parties as well as 
other undisputed facts. 
 
Thus, the Court’s decision on who to prove may not change the outcome of the 
dispute. For example, the Sardines panel ruled that a regulating party departing from an 
international standard should bear the burden of proving that such standard would not be 
appropriate to the level of protection it pursued.85 Although the AB reversed the panel’s 
finding and ruled that the complainants, not defendants, bear the burden of proving that 
the international standard would be appropriate, such reversal did not change the 
outcome of the case: the EC still lost since the AB simply found that the complainant met 
the proof burden.86  
 
In addition, new aspects of BOP, i.e., what to prove and whether to prove, also 
influence the conventional aspect of BOP, i.e., who to prove. Although a defending party 
(a regulating party) in general bears the burden of proving that a measure in question was 
necessary or relating to achieve the putative regulatory goal in terms of an affirmative 
defense (exception) under GATT Article XX,87 the WTC may instead require a 
complaining party to bear a heavier burden than usual in the preceding stage, i.e., when it 
establishes a prima facie case that the defending party violated a general obligation such as 
the National Treatment principle. This heavier standard of proof in an earlier stage on 
the complaining party tends to relieve the defending party of its own BOP at a later 
(exception) stage. 
 
For example, the AB in Asbestos held that the complaining party (Canada)’s initial 
burden of proving that France discriminated against Canadian asbestos in favor of its 
domestic substitute fibers was a “heavy” one.88 This holding reflects the AB’s critical 
observation that the carcinogenic asbestos and risk-free substitute fibers could not be 
treated alike.89 The AB found that: 
 
“This carcinogenicity, or toxicity, constitutes, as we see it, a defining aspect of the 
physical properties of chrysotile asbestos fibers. The evidence indicates that PCG 
                                                 
85  Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, ¶282, 
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002). 
86 Id. at 315.   
87 See supra pt. I. 
88  Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products 
Containing Asbestos, ¶118, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
89  Sydney M. Cone, III, The Asbestos Case and the Dispute Settlement in the WTO: the Uneasy 
Relationship Between Panels and the Appellate Body, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 103, 114-8 (2001). 
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fibers, in contrast, do not share these properties, at least to the same extent. We 
do not see how this highly significant physical difference cannot be a consideration 
in examining the physical properties of a product as part of a determination of 
“likeness” under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.”90  
 
Here, by incorporating health risks, which concerned GATT Article XX(b), into 
Article III:4 (National Treatment) consideration,91 the AB dramatically increased the 
complaining party (Canada)’s burden of establishing a prima facie case that Canadian 
asbestos, which was banned, and French substitute fibers, which were permitted, would be 
like products and thus deserve equal treatment. In fact, Canada’s initial onus of proof 
which the AB’s pro-regulation interpretation increased seemed too heavy for Canada to 
meet in a practical sense. It would be highly unlikely to expect that Canada would ever 
persuade the AB into accepting that Canadian asbestos and French substitute fibers are 
like despite the AB’s foregoing risk-driven interpretation on physical properties. As a 
result, the defending party (the EC) was in effect relieved of its burden to prove that the 
asbestos ban was necessary to protect human health in France. 
 
Therefore, the AB’s escalation, via interpretation, of a probative threshold 
(standard of proof) not only de facto shifted the burden of proof as to the necessity of the 
regulation but also created a de facto presumption of regulatory legitimacy which seems 
practically irrefutable.  
 
A similar reversal of proof burden through the Court’s construction of what to 
prove is found in Japan-Agricultural Products. Under the traditional necessity test under 
GATT Article XX, the defending party (Japan) would have had to demonstrate that its 
measure was the least trade restrictive means as an affirmative defense. In this case, 
however, the AB ruled that the complaining party (the U.S.) should demonstrate that a 
reasonable less-restrictive alternative to the regulation in question could have been 
feasible.92  
 
 
III. What Lies beneath the World Trade Court’s Burden: The 
Judicialization of Science  
 
A. The Judicial Regulation of Science  
 
                                                 
90 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products 
Containing Asbestos, ¶114, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (italics original, underlining added).  
91 SUNGJOON CHO, supra note _. 
92 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶126, WT/DS76/AB/R 
(Feb. 22 1999). 
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Investigating the WTO’s jurisprudence on risk regulations (e.g., SPS and TBT 
measures) under a new paradigm over the BOP, which is shifted from the parties’ burden 
to the Court’s burden, enables us to probe the Court’s rationale or “value” which may be 
defined as a set of basic priorities and assumptions around which its hermeneutics 
operates. Analyzing the jurisprudential track record of the last decade over risk 
regulations, one might reach a conclusion that the Court has not only adjudicated 
scientific cases but also judicialized scientific questions. In other words, the Court has 
rendered definite scientific answers, instead of merely resolving science-related disputes. 
 
This phenomenon of judicialization of science was launched in a paradigmatic 
case in this area, i.e., Hormones. Originally, the panel in Hormones imposed an initial BOP 
as to Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement (the prohibition of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination) on the complaining party (the United States). The United States argued 
that the EC’s asymmetrical regulatory treatment between naturally occurring hormones 
(in meat and other foods) which led to no regulatory intervention at all, and the 
artificially injected ones for growth promotion purposes which led to a total ban was 
arbitrary and unjustifiable.93 Having assessed the United States’ argument, the evidence 
that it adduced, and the expert opinions,94 the panel seemed to find that the initial BOP 
had shifted to the EC which should rebut what the United States had proven.95 The panel 
held that the EC had not met its BOP.96  
 
However, the AB reversed the panel’s finding of the EC’s arbitrarily and 
unjustifiably asymmetrical regulatory treatment between naturally-occurring hormones 
(no regulation at all) and artificially administered hormones (a total ban). Here, the AB 
endorsed the EC’s adoption of a zero-tolerance policy on hormone-treated beef by 
denying a comparison itself between these two situations in direct defiance of the 
conventional science which experts (scientists) represented in their opinions in this 
dispute. These scientists viewed that health risks from residual hormones in our body 
would be the same regardless of “differences in pathways taken or metabolites,” i.e., 
whether endogenously present or consumed via foods.97 Nonetheless, the AB replaced 
this conventional science by its own version when it transcendentally declared that there 
exists a “fundamental difference” between these two situations.98 It further criticized any 
                                                 
93 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
¶8.171, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997). 
94 “[A]ll scientific experts advising the Panel have concluded that residues of the three natural 
hormones present endogenously in meat and other foods or administered for therapeutic or zootechnical 
purposes are qualitatively the same as the residues of these hormones administered for growth promotion and 
that if any differences between these hormones could exist (e.g., differences in pathways taken or metabolites), 
these differences would in any event not have consequences for the potential adverse effects of these 
hormones.” Id. at ¶ 8.187 (emphasis added). 
95 Id. at ¶8.55. 
96 Id. at ¶ 8.197. 
97 Id. at ¶8.187. 
98 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶221, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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attempt to compare them as “absurdity.”99 Therefore, the AB sided with the EC which 
also argued that such fundamental difference in these two situations justified 
fundamentally different treatments (no intervention and a total ban) in them. 
 
The AB’s new science is quite reminiscent of the Kuhnian paradigm shift in that 
the AB changed the way which one should read and interpret the science as to hormones 
in food.100 It rejected the conventional science, i.e., laboratory science, over a common 
sense-based science which may befit the “real world where people live and work and die.” 
In doing so, the AB effectively created a new presumption in favor of the EC’s zero-
tolerance policy which was embodied in a total ban on hormone-treated beef. Suddenly, 
the hitherto defensive EC’s position seemed to turn offensive. Now, the United States 
should bear the burden of proving that the EC’s ban was still arbitrary and unjustifiable. 
Alas, however, the presumption is irrebuttable since the AB opined that the EC’s 
regulatory choice was basically incommensurable and sui generis. Simply, there exist no 
referential points against which one might evaluate its scientific justification. This might 
be bad news to the United States in this adversarial game.  
 
B. Scientific Uncertainty, Hercules and Phronesis 
 
The Hormones case is not an isolated, idiosyncratic anecdote: it certainly shares 
the same milieu with a modern ethos of social hygiene and welfare state fueled by highly 
emotionalized and thus politicized scandals on mad cow diseases and Frankenfoods.101 
Amid scientific uncertainty characterized by both too little and too much information, 
the same problem often generates totally different responses: some are risk-friendly as in 
the United States; others are risk-averse as in Europe. As Richard Gaskin observed, “it is 
now more fashionable to investigate the political and cultural frameworks surrounding 
scientific expertise.”102 These diametrically opposite regulatory philosophies in different 
jurisdictions naturally entail highly dogmatic use of the BOP. In asserting one’s own 
position, one tends to employ polemic strategies to highlight the opponent’s inability to 
disprove her default premise (presumption).103 Emanuel Kant earlier coined this tendency 
as the “polemical employment of pure reason.” Kant observed that: 
 
Here the contention is not that [one’s] own assertions may not, perhaps, 
be false, but only that no one can assert the opposite with apodeictic 
certainty, or even, indeed, with a greater degree of likelihood.”104 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100  In this sense, Jeffrey Atik observed that the Kuhnian paradigm shift is a “process of 
interpretation, not of observation.” Jeffrey Atik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 NW. J. 
INT'L L. & BUS. 736, 751 (1996-97). 
101  Julie A. Moore, Frankenfood or Doubly Green Revolution: Europe vs. American on the GMO 
Debate, http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/ch14.pdf (last visited February 28, 2007).    
102 GASKIN, supra note_, at 142. 
103 Id., at 212.   
104 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 739-40 (1964). 
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Obviously, such dogmatic confrontation between parties tends to result in a 
perpetual dispute armed with “arguments-from-ignorance,”105 which the Court may want 
to end with its vested judicial authority. Here, the Court inevitably assumes the role of 
transcendental tribunal, which Ronald Dworkin dubbed Hercules, which always renders 
“right answers” in that it brings to the dispute finality “at the margins of scientific 
knowledge” upon which parties themselves can never agree.106 In other words, the 
dimension in which the Court bestows its judgment upon disputants is transcendental 
because such judgment may not be reduced to those empirical scientific facts which 
disputants themselves maneuver against each other: the decision is of law, its 
hermeneutics and values behind it.  
 
Although the Court does embrace scientific facts which disputants adduce as 
evidence supporting their arguments, it never accepts them as they are. Instead, the 
Court assesses and interprets them in a way which sustains its own conclusion. Even 
expert opinions which the Court hears are not meant to replace the Court’s own 
judgment. The Court is free to selectively adopt those professional views or even depart 
from them entirely. More fundamentally it is within the Court’s discretion to decide when 
and whether to hear those opinions in the first place.  
 
The Court’s transcendental judicialization of science is amenable to a skeptical, or 
at least ambivalent, posture toward the authority of science echoed by Karl Popper and 
Thomas Kuhn. Popper was highly doubtful of modern science’s capability to establish 
universal laws and thus understood science only as a process, rather than the product of 
investigation.107 In the Popperian perspective, one may prove that a certain scientific 
finding is wrong, but cannot prove that such finding is true in a definite, apodeictic 
sense.108 From this perspective, any scientific discovery only tentatively holds water until 
it is proven wrong in the future.109 In a similar vein, Kuhn conceptualized this inherent 
limited value and influence of modern science in his famed term, “paradigm.”110 A 
paradigm of specific scientific disciplines (“normal science”) created and exercised by a 
selective scientific community is subject to being shifted in a different socio-cultural 
setting. Once shifted, the old and new paradigms are incommensurable.  
 
The AB in Hormones appears to subscribe to the Kuhnian perspective. To the AB, 
an international standard would be a reification of normal science observed by a 
narrowly-defined epistemic community such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
                                                 
105 GASKIN, supra note_, at 172-6. 
106 Id., at 213. 
107 See notably KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959); GASKIN, supra note_, 
at 152. 
108  Atik, supra note_, at 750 (citing KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
(1962)). 
109 Id. 
110 See notably THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); 
GASKIN, supra note_, at 152-53. 
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This specific version of science may not be authoritative enough to preempt different 
paradigms which a regulating country may adopt in determining its own appropriate level 
of protection. Therefore, the AB refused to impose the BOP to a regulating party which 
has decided to depart from the international standard.111 Likewise, in deciding whether 
the regulating party has conducted risk assessment based on scientific justification, the 
AB did not prioritize a certain paradigm espoused by a certain group of scientists, such as 
a mainstream view, over a different paradigm, such as a minority view, because these two 
would be incommensurable.  
 
The AB even rejected a comparison of residual hormone levels in human body 
and food with those in beef treated with growth promoting hormones. The AB reached 
this conclusion rather summarily, observing that any attempt to compare these two 
regulatory situations would lead to “absurdity.”112 This phronesis-driven paradigm rebuffs 
the normal science reincarnated in the Codex standard on the residual hormone levels, 
thereby rendering these two paradigms incomparable. To the AB as a reincarnation of 
Dworkian Hercules, political freedom based on reality and common sense should trump 
awkward laboratory science. This phronesis, not techne, should be a guiding principle 
under which the Court allocated an initial BOP as well as prescribe what to prove and 
whether to prove. Under this cognitive framework, it may be justified that a society reacts 
more seriously to any carcinogenic risks from environmental asbestos concentration (1 
death per 100,000 or less) than to those from car accidents (1,600 deaths per 100,000), 
despite an enormous stochastic gap between these two situations.113 
 
Here, the AB’s position is akin to Edmund Husserl’s criticism of modern science as 
a “mathematization of nature” totally detached from the “life-world” (Lebenswelt).114 From 
the AB’s prioritization of common sense (wisdom) over laboratory science (knowledge), 
one might catch a glimpse of the tradition of critical philosophy of anti-scientism which 
accuses scientific positivism espoused by August Conte of a self-fulfilling prophesy fatally 
alienated from actual life-world and human interests.115 In this sense, the AB’s rendition 
of science is close to the titular “trans-science” whose properties lie on a continuum 
between pure scientific facts and value (policy) judgment.116  
 
                                                 
111 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶102, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
112 Id. at ¶221 
113  Panel Report,  European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos, ¶3.54, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000); B.T. Commins, Estimations of Risk from Environmental 
Asbestos in Non-Occupational Exposure to Mineral Fibres, IARC SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION NO. 90, 476-483 
(1989). 
114 SIMON CRITCHLEY, CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 71 (2001). 
115 Id. at 112; See notably JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1968). 
116  See Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: 
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Perhaps the AB responded to the “democratic” concerns associated with regulatory 
decisions. Robert Howse locates a democratic value in the AB’s SPS jurisprudence. 
Howse views that the AB instilled the value of democratic rationality among citizens in 
the SPS interpretation by reserving a certain deliberative space where citizens’ value 
judgments can effectively trump any mainstream science.117 To Howse, the AB’s rejection 
of a widely accepted distinction between risk assessment (based on facts and science) and 
risk management (based on non-scientific, value-oriented judgments) might attest to the 
AB’s fidelity to the democratic value in that deliberative room may be bigger in the 
absence of a strict dichotomy between science and value. After all, the AB’s image of 
science does not originate from laboratories but from the “real world where people live 
and work and die.”118 To the AB, science, at least for the purposes of SPS, should be 
based on practical wisdom (phronesis), rather than on technical knowledge (techne). 
 
 
IV. Appraising the World Trade Court’s Burden: A Critical Perspective 
 
A. Diverging Oracles from Hercules: Incoherent Jurisprudence  
 
In the area of social regulation, in particular risk regulations such as SPS measures, 
the Court’s interpretive posture discussed above, i.e., judicialization of science, has been a 
driving force behind the WTO jurisprudence. Unfortunately, however, the 
aforementioned Herculean “right answer” thesis, which has been embedded in the 
Court’s prescriptive hermeneutics and thus applied to highly controversial scientific 
disputes, has created incoherent jurisprudence as it renders diverging findings over similar 
provisions or situations under the SPS Agreement and GATT Article XX. This 
jurisprudential incoherency can be found in three different yet still interrelated aspects: 
within the SPS Agreement, between the SPS Agreement and GATT Article XX, and 
finally between law and facts.  
 
This incoherency is problematic since it costs the WTO jurisprudence its vital 
asset, i.e., predictability. In addition, as Ronald Allen poignantly observed, while 
consistency may not ensure correctness, incoherency tends to guarantee errors.119 After 
all, diverging oracles from Hercules might confuse its receivers and therefore become a 
disservice, not a contribution, to them.  
 
                                                 
117 Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade 
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1. Incoherency within the SPS Agreement 
 
In Hormones, the AB was faithful to the principle of in dubio mitius. The AB 
basically characterized the health risks, i.e., carcinogenicity from beef hormones, as sui 
generis and incomparable to otherwise similar regulatory situations, such as health risks 
from endogenously occurring hormones. Hence, it found an unarbitrary and justifiable 
distinction between these two regulatory situations. The AB therefore accorded the EU a 
strong presumption in favour of its regulatory determination, which made it impossible for 
the complainant, the United States, to rebut. In the same context, the AB, quite contrary 
to how SPS text is structured, accorded the EC the right to depart from the relevant 
international standards (Codex standards) as well as the right to choose a zero-tolerance 
level of protection, disregarding the possibilities of any controlled use.  
 
Nonetheless, the Court has often departed from this deferential, sovereignty-
preserving hermeneutics in subsequent cases involving similar regulatory circumstances. 
In Salmon, the AB simply viewed the risks of diseases from ocean-caught salmon as 
comparable to those from herring used as bait and live ornamental finfish, while Australia 
vehemently argued for unique regulatory challenges that foreign salmon generated in 
terms of potential diseases. Australia noted that “salmon represented the only finfish on 
which a species-specific level of protection had been established”120 and that “risks 
associated with other aquatic animals could not be compared in the absence of a risk 
analysis.”121  
 
Here, Australia’s regulatory posture seems quite similar to that of the EU in 
Hormones, i.e., risk-averse, zero-tolerance level of protection in the absence of positive 
scientific evidence corroborating the hormoned beef’s safety. In other words, Australia 
would not need to adduce apodeicdic evidence proving that its ban on ocean-caught 
salmon is justifiable. Yet, the AB, in upholding the panel’s view, opined that a common 
risk of contracting only one common disease is sufficient enough to make two regulatory 
situations comparable.122 According to the AB’s approach, any two regulatory situations 
may still be comparable as long as they share at least one common element (e.g., disease) 
even though one is subject to additional risks (e.g., multiple, unknown diseases) than the 
other. Therefore, the AB substituted its own risk-friendly regulatory determination for 
Australia’s more cautious one. 
 
However, why should these two regulatory situations in Salmon, i.e., risks from 
ocean-caught salmon and those from herring used as bait and live ornamental finfish, be 
treated as “comparable,” while two other regulatory situations in Hormones, i.e., risks from 
naturally occurring hormones and those from artificially administered hormones, were 
                                                 
120 Panel Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶ 4.187, WS/DS18/R (June 
12, 1998) 
121 Id. at ¶ 4.189. 
122 Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶152, 
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998). 
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treated as “incomparable” despite that health risks from residual hormones in our body 
would be the same regardless of “differences in pathways taken or metabolites”?123 The 
AB rendered no explanation at all on this serious jurisprudential incoherence.  
 
Once the AB framed these two regulatory situations, i.e., regulating the 
importation of ocean-caught salmon, and that of herring used as baits and live 
ornamental finfish, comparable, the rest of the analysis under Article 5.5 seems to be 
rather automatic. First, the presence of sheer difference in regulatory treatment between 
the two situations, i.e., prohibiting importation and permitting importation, led the AB to 
generate a nearly irrebuttable presumption of “arbitrary and unjustifiable” discrimination 
in favour of the complainant as the complainant only had to demonstrate the existence of 
such difference. It was the defendant (regulating state) which should rebut the 
complainant’s argument by proving in turn that its regulation would be still unarbitrary 
and justifiable, which seemed to be quite daunting.  
 
Second, such arbitrariness and unjustifiability, once found, determines the onus of 
burden as to the rest elements of Article 5.5 to the detriment of defendants. Under the 
euphemistic labels of “warning signals,” the AB simply derived additional presumptions 
on the existence of “discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade” 
which are also detrimental to the defendant, from the original presumption of 
arbitrariness and unjustifiability.124 Under these circumstances, the defendant could 
hardly rebut such strong presumptions.  
 
This second-guessing on risk determination by the Court, which is certainly at 
variance with Hormones, culminates with its selective imposition of proof burden on a 
specific group of products in question. In Japan-Apple, a complaining party (the United 
States), in proving that Japan’s sanitary measures against the United States’ apples were 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, presented arguments and evidence 
concerning only “mature, symptomless” apples.125 Japan argued that the United States 
should also establish a prima facie case that “infected” apples would pose no risk as mature 
and symptomless apples would.126 However, both the panel and the AB ruled that it was 
Japan which should come up with any scientific evidence for such risk that infected 
apples would cause.127 The AB held that: 
 
[T]he Appellate Body's statement in EC – Hormones does not imply that the 
complaining party is responsible for providing proof of all facts raised in relation to 
the issue of determining whether a measure is consistent with a given provision of 
                                                 
123 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
¶1887, WS/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997). 
124 Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶¶161-163, 
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a covered agreement.  In other words, although the complaining party bears the 
burden of proving its case, the responding party must prove the case it seeks to 
make in response.128 
 
Critically, this innocuous-sounding construction by the AB on the BOP in fact 
betrays its hidden hermeneutical agenda, i.e., judicialization of science. The AB 
rationalized such mitigated BOP borne to the United States, i.e., the burden of making a 
prima facie case only with respect to “mature, symptomless” apples, on the ground that 
other apples, such as immature, infected apples, pose only a “small” or “debatable” risk 
which derives from human, technical errors and illegal actions.129 Here, the AB played the 
role of scientist, rather than judge. As a result, the AB bestowed on the United States a 
presumption of safety with respect to all apples it exports to Japan by allowing it to limit 
its proof burden to those apples in a normal situation. However, a sanitary regulation does 
not necessarily presuppose such normal situations. On the contrary, a sanitary regulation 
should take into account those errors and illegal actions which might actually happen. 
Basing its level of protection on such an optimistic scenario can hardly be imagined in any 
regulatory jurisdictions. In this context, the AB’s posture disregarding such risks, albeit 
small, is an unbearable risk-taking, which is a stark contrast with Hormones advocating a 
zero-tolerance approach to health risks.130  
 
All in all, these substantive rulings on specific risks which result in a risk-taking 
approach in Salmon and Japan-Apples depart blatantly from the deferential approach that 
the AB had taken in comparable cases, such as Hormones, in which the AB endorsed a 
“zero-tolerance” regulatory policy. Accordingly, the AB’s position deprives regulating 
states, such as Australia and Japan, of a presumption of legality (a right to regulate) and 
requires a heavy burden of adducing positive scientific evidence proving that peculiar 
risks might occur in the imported products in questions, such as ocean-caught Pacific 
salmon and apples from the United States. 
 
2. Incoherency between GATT and the SPS Agreement 
 
In addition to the SPS Agreement, Article XX (General Exceptions) of GATT 
also provides a justification mechanism with which a regulating country can prove that 
their health or other social regulations are necessary to achieve legitimate policy 
objectives. As within the SPS Agreement, one can witness yet another jurisprudential 
incoherency between the SPS Agreement and GATT over similar regulatory situations. 
The Court’s own substantive evaluation of various societal risks in deciding whether a 
certain measure was really necessary to achieve a putative regulatory goal under GATT 
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Article XX tends to complicate a holistic understanding of its jurisprudence related to the 
similar regulatory situation subject to the SPS Agreement which bestows a right to 
regulate. 
 
At first blush, the Court’s interpretations on GATT and SPS seem to converge. In 
determining whether a French ban over Canadian asbestos products was necessary to 
protect human health under GATT Article XX (b), the Asbestos court issued the SPS-
line of statement, i.e., “it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine 
the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”131 
Then, the AB upheld the zero-tolerance policy over asbestos adopted by France, noting 
that “controlled use” would not be an alternative since it would not guarantee a zero risk 
that France had pursued.132 Undoubtedly, this strong presumption in favor of France’s 
regulatory autonomy tends to relieve France of its otherwise heavy burden of proving that 
its ban was necessary to protect human health as an exception, not as a right, under 
GATT Article XX (b). 
 
However, the pendulum of the Court’s substantive interpretation on risks and 
regulations swing to the opposite direction in other similar situations under GATT 
Article XX. In Korean Beef, the United States challenged the Korean “dual retail system” 
under which foreign beef should be sold separately from domestic beef (Hanwoo) to 
prevent deceptive practices by retailers to misrepresent cheaper imported beef as more 
expensive Hanwoo. This rather drastic measure, which is in fact a zero-risk approach to 
these fraudulent practices, could be deemed necessary considering not only high 
commercial values on Hanwoo but also certain socio-cultural attachments to this 
indigenous beef within the unique context of Korean society. Even the panel 
acknowledged that the system was introduced at a time when these frauds were 
widespread in the beef sector and that it “does appear to reduce the opportunities and 
thus the temptations for butchers to misrepresent [less expensive] foreign beef for [more 
expensive] domestic beef.”133 
 
If a reasonable person applies the Hormone and Asbestos case law to this situation, 
she would find few difficulties in finding that the dual retail system was necessary to 
prevent frauds. However, in a diametrically opposite posture from Hormones and Asbestos, 
the Court in Korean Beef second-guessed the Korean government’s regulatory judgment 
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through the creation of a quite intrusive doctrine, the “weighing and balancing” test. The 
AB viewed that: 
 
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not "indispensable", 
may nevertheless be "necessary" within the contemplation of Article 
XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of 
factors which prominently include the contribution made by the 
compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, 
the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or 
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on 
imports or exports.134 
 
This doctrine strips regulating members of their regulatory autonomy in that the 
Court, not the regulating country, would judge over all the details related to a given 
measure in question. In effect, the doctrine usurps from the regulating country a critical 
presumption of in dubio mitius and thus gravely increases its proof burden in litigation. 
Obviously, this omniscient attitude of the Court is yet another manifestation of its 
Herculean image. The Court appears to believe that it, not the regulating country, is 
capable of delivering right answers on critical regulatory questions, such as “the extent to 
which the measure contributes to the realization of the end pursued, the securing of 
compliance with the law or regulation at issue.”135 
 
Saddled with this commandeering interpretive posture, Hercules in Korean Beef de 
facto overrode Hormones without rendering any plausible reasons. First, in Hormones, the 
AB refused to equate a regulatory situation over naturally-occurring hormones with that 
over artificially-treated hormones, despite the conflicting scientific evidence. However, in 
Korean Beef, the AB trivialized the uniqueness of the Korean regulatory challenge over 
domestic beef by comparing Hanwoo with other more mundane foods, such as pork and 
seafood.136 Tellingly, the very fact that Korea had not suffered any major scandals on the 
misrepresentation of foreign pork or foreign seafood as domestic counterparts testifies to 
the incomparability between these two regulatory situations.  
 
Second, by implementing a dual retail system, the Korean government took a very 
conservative approach toward this problem, which is analogous to a zero-tolerance policy 
in Hormones. The AB should have respected this high level of protection in the beef 
sector by the Korean government, as it accepted the EC’s total ban as legitimate and thus 
rejected the complainant’s arguments on the “controlled use.” Yet, in Korean Beef, the AB 
replaced the Korean regulatory determination by its own right answer and ruled that 
Korea could have used softer measures, which are tantamount to the controlled use in 
                                                 
134 Appellate Body Report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶164, 
WS/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (emphasis added). 
135 Id. at ¶163. 
136 Id. at ¶168. 
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Hormones, such as fines, record-keeping and policing.137 Here, the AB simply ignored a 
fundamental fact that the dual retail system had to be introduced only because these 
conventional enforcement measures did not work.  
 
Critically, this Herculean second-guessing shaped the contour of the Court’s 
decision on the BOP. First, the AB, siding with the panel, placed a high proof burden on 
Korea under which Korea should prove that “no alternative measure consistent with the 
WTO Agreement is reasonably available at present.”138 Then, the AB ruled that those 
conventional enforcement measures applied to the same kind of illegal behaviors were 
reasonably expected.139 Therefore, the AB simply dismissed the Korean zero-tolerance 
policy as unpersuasive, i.e., failing to discharge the abovementioned proof burden,140 
instead of according Korea a margin of appreciation on its own regulatory situation, as the 
AB certainly did in Hormones. The AB’s own regulatory solution, which made the dual 
retail system look unreasonable, sounds almost admonishing. The AB viewed that: 
 
Violations of laws and regulations like the Korean Unfair Competition Act 
can be expected to be routinely investigated and detected through 
selective, but well-targeted, controls of potential wrongdoers.  The control 
of records will assist in selecting the shops to which the police could pay 
particular attention.141 
 
It seems puzzling why the AB did not rule in the same way over this kind of 
regulatory alternative (controlled use) in Hormones and Asbestos. In Asbestos, Canada 
demonstrated that technological innovations created various regulatory alternatives to a 
total asbestos ban adopted by France, and that a number of countries were in fact 
implementing these alternatives.142 In its third-party submission, Zimbabwe also pointed 
out some plausible alternatives to the ban, including the disclosure requirement assisting 
consumers to make informed decisions on asbestos products as well as the certification 
system for those who treat asbestos.143 Nonetheless, the AB ruled that: 
 
[I]t is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the 
level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given 
situation. France has determined, and the Panel accepted, that the chosen 
level of health protection by France is a "halt" to the spread of asbestos-
related health risks.144 
                                                 
137 Id. at ¶180. 
138 Id. at ¶167 (emphasis added).  
139 Id. at ¶172 (emphasis added). 
140 Id. at ¶181. 
141 Id. 
142  Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos , ¶3.55, WS/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). 
143 Id. at ¶¶4.97-98. 
 144  Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products 
Containing Asbestos, ¶168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
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In our view, France could not reasonably be expected to employ any 
alternative measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the 
very risk that the Decree seeks to "halt".  Such an alternative measure 
would, in effect, prevent France from achieving its chosen level of health 
protection.145  
 
This utter incoherence between Hormones/Asbestos (SPS) and Korean Beef 
(GATT) is quite problematic in that it tends to send a confusing signal to the audience in 
the global trading community and thus discourages a holistic understanding of the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  
 
3. Inconsistency between Law and Facts  
 
The Court has addressed the BOP question, such as whether to prove or what to 
prove, in a selective, and therefore inconsistent, manner between a matter of law and that 
of fact. Sometimes, the Court sidesteps the BOP question by constructing certain 
controversial issues as a matter of fact and thus deferring the question to the lower 
tribunal (panel)’s interpretation. Some other times, however, the Court itself engages in 
the BOP question by constructing those issues of controversy as a matter of law. 
 
In Dominican Cigarette, the tax code of the Dominican Republic required that 
stamps be affixed on all cigarette packets in its territory. Although the tax stamp 
requirement applied to both domestic and foreign cigarettes, foreign cigarette producers 
decried the requirement as discriminatory since stamps had to be affixed on the imported 
cigarette packets in the Dominican warehouses in the presence of Dominican tax 
inspectors, instead of being affixed in the exporting countries beforehand.146  
 
 The Dominican Republic justified the tax stamp requirement under GATT 
Article XX (d), claiming that it was “necessary” to prevent tax evasion and cigarette 
smuggling.147 In the same line with Hormones and Asbestos, the Dominican Republic 
argued that it has “no reasonable alternatives” to achieve its desired level of enforcement, 
which it has the right to determine.148 Both the case law and international practices on 
this subject seem to support the Dominican position. The panel in Argentina – Hides and 
Leather certainly recognized that prevention techniques, such as tax stamps, could address 
                                                 
145 Id. at ¶174. 
146  Panel Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Import and Sale of Cigarettes, ¶4.3, 
WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 2004). 
147 Id. at ¶4.89. 
148 Id. at ¶4.93. 
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tax evasion.149 The International Conference on Illicit Tobacco Trade (ICITT) has also 
identified tax stamps as a legitimate tool to deter distribution of illegal imports.150  
 
However, the panel viewed that a reasonable alternative, such as “providing 
secure tax stamps to foreign exporters and affixing the stamps abroad, possibly under the 
supervision of a reputable company that would conduct pre-shipment inspection and 
certification,” was available, and thus held that the Dominican Republic had failed to 
establish that the tax stamp requirement is justified under GATT Article XX(d).151 The 
Dominican Republic appealed this ruling, highlighting that cigarette producers “actively 
collaborate” to smuggle cigarettes and that alcoholic beverages are vastly smuggled when 
allowing the affixation of tax stamps abroad.152 
 
The AB upheld the panel’s ruling, yet did so in a rather astounding logic. The AB 
blindly endorsed the panel’s second-guessing of the Dominican regulatory situation, 
which departed from the previous jurisprudence in Hormones and Asbestos. The AB 
simply categorized the panel’s view that the tax stamp requirement was “of limited 
effectiveness” as “findings of fact” and deferred this issue to the panel under DSU Article 
11.153 In other words, the AB unconditionally accepted the panel’s findings on such issues 
as “limited effectiveness of the tax stamp requirement in preventing forgery, smuggling 
and tax evasion; greater effectiveness and efficiency of measures such as security features 
incorporated into the tax stamps or police controls.”154 
 
However, the panel’s findings concern more of the standard of review or deference, 
rather than of factual findings. Although these findings do involve certain facts, a more 
fundamental question is whether the panel, not the Dominican Republic itself, should 
render a definite prescription on this regulatory problem. In Hormones and Asbestos, the 
AB upheld the right to regulate as well as the principle of in dubio mitius, thereby never 
second-guessing the zero-tolerance policy. While this deferential interpretation, or the 
liberal standard of proof, certainly involves an issue of law, the AB in this case labeled it 
as an issue of fact and thus escaped its burden. 
 
Under the AB’s logic, it should have also accepted the panel’s findings in 
Gambling as factual findings. In Gambling, the panel concluded that the U.S.’ ban on 
cross-border gambling was not a necessary measure since the U.S. could have pursued a 
reasonably available alternative, i.e., “engaging in consultations with Antigua, with a view 
to arriving at a negotiated settlement that achieves the same objectives as the challenged 
                                                 
149 Panel Report, Argentina–Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather, ¶11.305, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000). 
150 Panel Report, Dominican Republic-Import and Sale of Cigarettes, ¶4.90, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 
2004).  
151 Id. at  ¶¶7.232, 7.233 and 8.1(e). 
152 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Import and Sale of Cigarettes, 
¶12, WT/DS155/AB/R (Aug. 31, 2001). 
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United States' measures.”155 Yet, the AB rejected the panel’s finding as flawed in that the 
panel’s solution was not a reasonable alternative because “consultations are by definition 
a process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore not capable of comparison with 
the measures at issue in this case.”156 
 
The incoherency between Dominican Cigarette and Gambling is prominent. The 
AB characterized the panel’s “necessity” analysis under GATT Article XX as a matter of 
fact in the former case, while it constructed the same analysis as a matter of law in the 
latter case. Therefore, in the former case the panel’s conclusion on whether (and what) to 
prove was upheld, while in the latter case the same conclusion was rejected.  
 
In sum, if the AB agrees with the panel’s findings on critical issues, the AB will 
elect not to intervene in the panel’s findings on the ground that “the Panel's 
consideration and weighing of the evidence. . . relates to its assessment of the facts and, 
therefore, falls outside the scope of appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.”157 
However, if the AB disagrees with the panel’s interpretation even on facts, the AB will 
interfere with it by converting these originally factual issues into legal ones. This 
incoherent exercise of the Court’s hermeneutical burden tends to undermine the 
credibility of WTO jurisprudence in general.  
 
B. Finality over Legitimacy: Legitimacy Crisis  
 
1. Judicialization as Finality  
 
In addition to creating jurisprudential incoherency and its consequent confusion, 
the Court’s judicialization of science and/or regulatory second-guessing through the BOP 
risks undermining the Court’s legitimacy as a fair arbiter. Judicialization means finality 
since the Court’s final ruling, once adopted, becomes the law in a given dispute: the case 
is closed for all. The Court might want to justify this finality through science or any other 
form of rationality. To the Court, science is a universal language through which the Court 
could authoritatively utter an ultimate substantive decision. As Hercules, the Court 
would always be capable of rendering a right answer for each dispute.  
 
However, any specific version of science or other form of rationality which the 
Court picks for its own use may be just one out of many paradigms or perspectives.158 
                                                 
155 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling, 
¶317, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
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157 Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶261, 
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998). 
158  “Scientific knowledge, one finds, is hardly universal. What is true and certain within one 
scientific community constitutes baseless conjecture in another. Science is also intrinsically historical; it is 
science-of-the-moment.” Atik, supra note _, at 738. 
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Critically, this peculiar way of understanding and interpreting science leads the Court to 
disregard certain responses from parties and attach importance to one kind of response 
over others.159 It is at this juncture that the Court’s judicialization of science becomes 
“political,” not scientific (objective). Under these circumstances, the Court’s exercise of 
its hermeneutical burden over the BOP tends to erode its legitimacy by inviting more, not 
less, politics from the parties concerned.  
 
Since the Court is not a political organ, such politicization would not be tolerated 
at least by a losing party which might resent the fact that it has lost its case due to 
political, not scientific (objective), reasons. If the losing party is an importer (regulating 
country), it would feel deprived of its regulatory autonomy, and even sovereignty. If the 
losing party is an exporter, it would feel frustrated over its stymied market access. Either 
such regulatory failure (under-regulation) or trade failure (over-regulation) would 
generate resentment of the losing party towards the Court, thereby eroding the Court’s 
compliance pull, i.e., legitimacy.160 
 
2. Over-Regulative Finality: Science under Politics  
 
The Court’s judicialization of science, and subsequently politicization of science, 
tends to make the Court more comfortable in departing from conventional scientific 
positions represented by widely accepted international standards and practices. In doing 
so, the Court not only blends science and politics but also marginalizes conventional 
science for the sake of politics.  
 
At first glance, faced with tons of documents from both parties which only 
advocate their own versions (paradigms) of science as well as lengthy expert opinions, the 
Court’s task seems to be that of a “Science Court” which determines “both the meaning 
and the merits of the risk assessment documents” as well as “the truth of various scientific 
propositions.”161 It might purport to deliver a scientifically correct, and thus legitimate, 
answer.162  
 
However, a WTO version of Science Court is fatally prone to politically motivated 
over-regulation and the consequent restraint of trade not only because WTO panelists 
and AB members are non-experts in these scientific matters but also because science can 
only be judicialized in a transcendental, which is basically political, fashion.163 
                                                 
159 Atik, supra note_, at 736-37. 
160 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 49 (1990). 
161 Walker, supra note _, at 301-2.  
162 Cf. Gaskin, supra note_, at 163; Walker, supra note_, at 255 (arguing that the WTO should not 
become a “global mega-regulator” which would resolve scientific disputes involving carcinogenicity or 
acceptable levels of risks). 
163  See Theofanis Christoforou, Genetically Modified Organisms: Colloquium Article Settlement of 
Science-Based Trade Disputes in the WTO: A Critical Review of the Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific 
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For example, the AB in Hormones reversed the panel’s ruling that a regulating 
party (EC), when its measure, i.e. a total ban, departed from the Codex standard on the 
residual hormone levels, should bear the burden of proving that the ban was nonetheless 
scientifically justified. The AB, driven by a politically charged assumption of members’ 
regulatory prerogative, ruled that it is the complaining party (United States) which should 
prove that the ban was not scientifically justified. In doing so, the AB downgraded the 
significance of SPS-endorsed international standards, such as the Codex standard, despite 
the Agreement being seriously committed to those standards as a vehicle for 
harmonization.164 
 
However, international standards, at least those that are explicitly recognized in 
the SPS Agreement, such as the Codex standard, are a reification of WTO Members’ 
sovereignty-checking commitments to achieve a communal goal of harmonization. The 
AB’s reversal of the BOP risks undoing these initial commitments and sending a false 
signal that a regulating country is free to disregard international standards whenever it 
finds them inconvenient.165 As a result, the AB’s BOP hermeneutics on international 
standards may result in the serious underuse of these standards, thereby undermining 
their legitimacy. Moreover, members’ indifference and lack of inputs to international 
standards would also deter these standards from being further developed and improved, 
which is evidently inconsistent with what the SPS Agreement envisions.166  
 
Furthermore, in Hormones, the AB dismissed a legitimate distinction between risk 
assessment (science) and risk management (politics), which has widely been accepted in 
scientists’ circles,167 purely on a narrow textual ground.168 As a result, the AB shrunk an 
                                                                                                                                                 
practice “leaves too much discretion to non-expert, non-specialized panellists to judge issues of tremendous 
scientific complexity”). See also David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Tra
 de Disciples, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817, 844 (1994) (hereinafter Wirth, Role of Science) (observing 
that the idea of science court is impractical because science is not justiciable in an adversarial setting even if 
all the judges are scientists).  
164 “To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall 
base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, 
where they exist. . .” SPS, supra note_, art. 3.1 (emphasis added). See Grando, supra note_, at 622-23, 632 
(observing that the Hormone panel characterized SPS art. 3.3 as an exception to art. 3.1 based on the text 
(“except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3”)). 
165 See Horn & Weiler, supra note_, at 263; Joshua Meltzer, State Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of 
the WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 693, 721 (2005). 
166 “Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the relevant international 
organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International 
Office of Epizootics, and the international and regional organizations operating within the framework of the 
International Plant Protection Convention, to promote within these organizations the development and 
periodic review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures.” SPS, supra note_, art. 3.4 (emphasis added). 
167 See e.g., Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) & World Health Organization (WHO), RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND FOOD SAFETY (1997). 
168 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶176, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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independent space for conventional science under the SPS. The conventional science in 
this case was at odds with the ban as it dismissed the necessity of regulatory 
differentiation between naturally occurring hormones and artificially injected hormones 
despite their different pathways.169 The Hormone panel attempted to preserve the integrity 
of this critical scientific finding by distinguishing risk assessment (an “examination of data 
and studies”)170 from risk management (a “policy exercise involving social value 
judgments made by political bodies”).171 Yet, the AB dramatically undermined the rigor of 
a risk assessment requirement, and thus science itself, by electing a very loose 
construction of risk assessment permitting the consideration of non-empirical, non-
experimental factors, which could encompass even non-scientific considerations, such as 
fears and human biases.172  
 
Critically, widely accepted scientific practices, which are the outcome of hitherto 
scientific deliberation and discourse, should not be discarded lightly. The AB’s rather 
dogmatic stance like the one in Hormones may suffocate further discourse, and be abused 
to cater to pseudo-science and/or protectionism. Even politicians should heed what 
scientists have found: politicians should not manipulate science in a way which serves 
their political needs. 
 
If we maintain a distinction between risk assessment (science) and risk 
management (politics), we may at least locate a logical sequence between these two stages. 
In other words, risk assessment should come before risk management, not vice versa. 
Without a scientific investigation in the first place, the determination of an appropriate 
level of protection could not be obtained. Yet, in Hormones the AB ignored this sequence 
and in effect mingled risk assessment and risk management.  
 
The AB did recognize that the EC failed to comply with Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement since the EC conducted no assessment on risk caused by any abusive use of 
hormones and the administrative difficulties in control of the hormones for growth 
promotion purposes.173 The EC therefore failed to provide any scientific assessment on the 
administrative risk (controlled use) vis-à-vis the zero-tolerance policy. This failure should 
have generated a presumption that the EC’s determination of its level of protection would 
not be appropriate. After all, how could the EC confidently choose the zero-tolerance 
level of protection, which would deny the possibilities of controlled use or administration 
                                                 
169 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
¶ 8.187, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997).  
170 Id., ¶¶8.107, 8.110, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997). 
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with good practice, without any scientific investigation on such an exorbitant option in 
the first place?  
 
Therefore, under the AB’s approach, the EC might ex post justify its pre-
determined strict regulatory position, shaped purely by political considerations, by 
locating, or even creating, favorable scientific studies. This sorry state of science under 
politics tends to advocate over-regulation at the expense of legitimate trade interests.  
 
3. Under-Regulative Finality: Regulatory Autonomy Lost  
 
The Court’s Herculean hermeneutics over the BOP also tends to “second-guess” 
the regulating countries’ legitimate policies. This is yet another judicialization of science 
in that the Court itself assesses all the risks and effectiveness of possible policy options 
through its own reasoning to deliver a substantive finality to a given dispute. Such finality 
may be labeled as political in that the Court’s own reasoning may not always be shared by 
parties, in particular the losing party. The Court’s second-guessing under GATT Article 
XX is conducted via the titular ‘weighing and balancing test” invented in Korean Beef. 
Under the test, the AB launched a highly intrusive judicial review in which it assessed 
both the means and ends of a domestic regulation in question.174  
 
As discussed above,175 this test represents a serious incoherency in the Court’s 
hermeneutics as it blatantly departs from its in dubio mitius standard established in 
Hormones. The basic assumption of the test is flawed since it presupposes Hercules who 
would know better than local regulators all the necessary details, such as the actual level 
of protection or what would have been necessary to achieve a certain legitimate policy 
objective in a given situation. Under the test, it would be very difficult for a defending 
(regulating) party to discharge its burden of proving that its measure was necessary to 
achieve its own level of protection before a seemingly omniscient, and commandeering, 
Court. 
 
Another concern related to the weighing and balancing test centres on the North-
South tension. In most cases, developing countries’ regulatory challenges as well as their 
regulatory solutions are unique and hard to generalize. Options available to developed 
countries may not be feasible to them mainly due to the lack of resources and capacity. If 
these circumstances are not fully taken into account under the weighing and balancing 
                                                 
174 “In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not “indispensable,” may nevertheless be 
“necessary” within the contemplation of Article XX (d), involves in every case a process of weighing and 
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process, an adjudicatory outcome might be out of sync with the reality, and thus both 
offensive and ineffective, and therefore illegitimate.  
 
This is precisely why the Thai Cigarette panel under the old GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism was criticized so harshly. Despite the World Health Organization 
(WHO)’s support for the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes to protect public health in 
developing countries, the GATT panel struck it down on the ground that Thailand failed 
to prove that its ban was the least trade restrictive. The panel viewed that Thailand could 
have found other alternatives, which were highly hypothetical and might have only been 
effective to rich countries. This northern bias can also be found in a more recent case. In 
Dominican Cigarettes,176 the AB struck down a Dominican tax stamp requirement simply 
because the Court was not persuaded by the Dominican Republic’s regulatory decision 
and thus held that the Dominican Republic failed to prove the effectiveness of the tax 
stamp requirement. In doing so, the AB failed to realize that for a developing country like 
the Dominican Republic, the AB’s own alternatives, such as conventional enforcement 
measures, would not work in achieving the level of protection which the Dominican 
Republic desired to pursue with its limited budget and staff.  
 
The Court’s lack of regulatory deference to developing countries,, when 
juxtaposed with a diametrically opposite position in other cases involving developed 
countries, tends to arouse a suspicion on the Court’s legal realism, i.e., its bias against less 
powerful WTO members. In Hormones, Asbestos and Gambling, which involved politically 
powerful developed countries, such as the EC and the Unites States, the Court seemed to 
be quite deferential to local regulators who stuck to a highly conservative regulatory 
position, such as a zero-tolerance policy.177 Yet, in other cases, such as Salmon, Dominican 
Cigarette and Korean Beef, which involved politically less powerful members, such as 
Australia, Dominican Republic and Korea, the Court seemed to feel more comfortable in 
second-guessing local regulators’ decisions and presenting its own prescriptions. Therefore, 
legal realists might contend that the Court instrumentalizes the BOP as a “tool to support 
result-oriented findings.”178 
 
4. Finality without Compliance Pull: Legitimacy at Risk 
 
The WTO is not a World Government nor does it have a well-developed 
legislative mechanism as seen in other institutions, such as the European Union. 
Moreover, socio-cultural foundations for risks and regulation vary among different 
members. This lack of both positivistic infrastructure and common moral foundations 
among members tends to disenable the WTO tribunal from producing truly legitimate 
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answers to controversial regulatory disputes involving health risks and regulatory 
responses. In other words, with little shared regulatory ethos, i.e., shared assumptions on 
regulatory decision-making, as well as administrative and political efforts to build up such 
ethos via mutually recognized and trusted institutions, any substantive closure on highly 
combustible issues, such as regulations over beef hormones or genetically modified foods, 
by an unelected international tribunal lacks a base for legitimization, and thus appears as 
imprudent judicial activism.179  
 
Even if the Court attempts to close a case by rendering a final, substantive answer 
to a dispute, the losing party can re-open the case merely by window-dressing violative 
measures, instead of truly implementing the answer. Then, the winning party will have to 
re-commence a new litigation in an attempt to re-close the original dispute. The World 
Trade Court’s incapability to close a dispute is not merely attributable to parties’ insincere 
implementation of its original decision. In many cases, especially those involving 
controversial and complicated public health policies, the Court’s final decision might not 
be final, or at least might not be regarded final by the losing party, for a number of reasons.  
 
First of all, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to digest all 
the sophisticated, technical scientific evidence and evaluate them to produce a final 
answer. Second, as discussed above,180 the Court’s interpretation of science in a specific 
context may diverge from that of members. Under these circumstances, if the Court’s 
ruling is based on its own substantive processing of all the scientific evidence, such a 
ruling might be hard for the losing party to accept. Third, since more often than not the 
Court’s decision addresses only limited, specific provision-based issues, such decisions 
could not fully address the root of an underlying dispute over a certain regulatory 
policy.181 Under these circumstances, as Richard Gaskin aptly observed, the Court might 
broaden the existing divisions between the litigants, rather than settling their dispute.182 
 
Therefore, the Court encroaches upon its legitimacy as a neutral adjudicative 
organ when it renders substantive justice based on its own weighing and balancing over 
highly controversial and sophisticated issues such as health risks.183 Both parties and 
observers might translate the Court’s decision as its own subjective value, or even moral 
statement on these political subjects, instead of a case-specific ruling on certain narrow 
                                                 
179 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author’s Reflections, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 937, 
940 (1999). 
180 See supra pt. IV.B.3.   
181  Panel Report, European Communities-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶4.5, 
WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006).  
182 GASKIN, supra note_, at 208. 
183  Cf. David A. Wirth, European Communities Restrictions on Imports of Beef Treated with 
Hormones–Non-Tariff Barriers–Control of Food Additives–Scientific Basis for Restrictions – WTO Dispute 
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legal issues.184 It is likely that parties and observers view that the Court itself is right or 
wrong, rather than noting that a specific decision which it renders may be right or wrong. 
 
Concededly, all disputes may potentially be political cases. Nonetheless, these 
issues are not traditional trade issues such as tariffs and discrimination in which the Court 
tends to enjoy a certain aura of legitimacy both from its time-honored jurisprudence on 
these issues and from the relatively clear-cut nature of the cases. Yet, certain regulatory 
issues are still in their adolescence both inside and outside the WTO. Countries have yet 
to develop a common language over widely shared premises in tackling these troublesome 
issues. Without these common grounds, a losing party will be reluctant to accept any 
balancing test exercised by the Court sharing with it none of such regulatory ethos. This 
legitimacy risk tends to become more salient when the losing party is a poor country to 
which any high regulatory standards might be potential trade barriers impeding and 
hindering their market access to rich countries.  
 
Finally, cognitive psychology casts dark clouds over final rulings rendered by 
Herculean judges. Obviously, both panelists and the Appellate Body members are neither 
Hercules nor any other superhuman. They are just humans, like everyone else, prone to 
errors and biases, especially “cognitive” ones. When they process and interpret critical 
scientific evidence presented by parties, they may adopt their own perspectives, or 
heuristics, which selectively filter certain evidentiary objects, such as scientific reports or 
expert opinions, and thus influence their probative determinations.185 This “cognitive 
filtering”186 tends to question the very rationale of the normative possibility of “objective 
assessment” under Article 11 of the DSU.  
 
This cognitive bias may be further maintained or reinforced by “political” 
considerations of panelists or the Appellate Body members over their decisions. As long 
as their appointment, and even selection, remains “political rather” than meritorious, they 
are keen to political ramifications of their decisions. From a legal realist’s perspective, 
they may choose who should win even before they hear the case solely in accordance with 
what and who are involved. They may also be tempted to blend adequate nuances and 
subtleties, often in the form of dicta, with their decisions, paying certain face-making 
tributes to losers.  
 
 
V. Discharging the World Trade Court’s Burden: A Procedural Turn 
 
                                                 
184 Cf. Mark D. Rosen, Defrocking the Courts: Resolving 'Cases or Controversies,' Not Announcing 
Transcendental Truths, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 728 (1994).  
185 See generally Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 273 (1989). 
186 Id. 
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A. A Copernican Turn: Legitimacy over Finality 
 
The Court, in adjudicating those WTO disputes involving risk regulations and 
other similar social regulations, has determined who to prove, what to prove and whether 
to prove from the standpoint of Herculean judges which render definite right 
(substantive) answers with its transcendental authority. This judicialization of science 
tends to discount scientific uncertainty as well as unique local regulatory context, thereby 
making losing parties resist accepting final decisions. That is, adjudication in the WTO is 
not likely to close risk-related disputes, and parties would continue to claim substantive 
authority on its own position to dismiss the other party’s case. Losing parties would be 
tempted to window dress the Court’s decision and eager to find circumventive measures 
to stand by its original position.187 Ironically, judicialization of science tends to drive 
parties to cling to the “transcendental critiques” which trivialize the very objective 
authority of science.188 
 
At this juncture, one might be tempted to overcome this substantive dilemma by 
perfecting the Court’s technical criteria, such as streamlining the standards of proof in the 
line of “preponderance of evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”189 or bestowing a 
higher degree of deference to one party, such as a regulating party.190 However, this 
attempt to articulate the standard of proof seems to make no practical differences as long 
as the Court’s standard of review remains substantive. After all, whether the Court is 
convinced or not hinges on its free evaluation of evidence and arguments adduced by 
parties. 
 
If the Court cannot overcome the aforementioned substantive dilemma, it must 
avoid the dilemma. Instead of closing indefinite cases by prescribing definite answers, the 
Court should encourage parties to continue talking, deliberating and cooperating with 
each other until they reach a mutually acceptable regulatory solution. To achieve this, 
the Court may unearth procedural elements, such as reason-giving, embedded in major 
provisions, and determine the BOP questions (who to prove, what to prove and whether 
to prove) for these provisions in accordance with parties’ performance of those procedural 
disciplines.191 
 
                                                 
187 EU Approves  Farm Animal Hormone Ban, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Vol.6, No. 
43, Dec. 20, 2002. 
188 GASKIN, supra note_, at 146. 
189 But see Walker, supra note_, at 290-95 (prescribing certain standards of proof to a WTO panel 
and the Appellate Body).  
190 Christoforou, supra note_, at 644 (arguing that “in the area of food safety and health protection, 
the burden of proof for parties challenging trade barriers would be higher than for the defending WTO 
member” because “a wrongful finding could have potentially disastrous effects on the lives of millions of 
people”). 
191  Some commentators view that the Court has already performed this task. See Armin von 
Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO–Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y. B. 
U. N. L., 609, 667 (2001) (trenchantly observing that the “Appellate Body proceduralizes the substantive 
WTO obligations and compels the members to try to achieve a multilateral consensus”). 
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One might argue that the Court should accord a regulating country an absolute 
deference in risk determination. As Cass Sunstein, Richard Pildes, and Kip Viscusi 
observe, any risks can be characterized by their “contextual” circumstances and thus 
proved to be sui generis. For example, people tend to perceive uncontrollable, artificial, 
and involuntarily imposed risks more seriously than other controllable, natural, and 
voluntarily accepted risks, even though the probability that these two different risks may 
materialize are actually identical.192 In this situation, democratic rationality may entail a 
conservative regulatory posture, even if it proves to be unscientific in a technical sense, 
and SPS would not find such conservatism as arbitrary or unjustifiable.  
 
However, this position overlooks the dynamic nature of people’s perception of 
risks. People’s original perceptions of risks are prone to change by means of further 
education. Thus, any given perception cannot but be provisional and subject to future 
alteration. This is why even deference to a regulating country in the line of in dubio mitius 
should always be accompanied by certain procedural disciplines which not only prevent 
any abuse of such deference but also keep the door of enlightenment open. The Court 
can effectively oversee any abuse of deference by scrutinizing the regulating country’s 
adherence to procedural duties explicit and implicit under the SPS Agreement. If the 
regulating country respects these duties in setting its own level of protection, and yet such 
measure still restrains trade, this restraint must be tolerated.193 
 
 B. Discharging the Court’s Burden: Reinterpreting WTO Provisions on Risk Regulation 
 
1. Necessity Test (GATT Article XX) 
 
The Court’s “weighing and balancing test” may impose a high probative threshold 
on a defending (regulating) country, requiring it to prove that the measure in question 
was the least trade restrictive and thus there were no other reasonably available 
alternatives. Because it is the Court that actually weighs and balances those actual and 
hypothetical policy options, the outcome of such weighing and balancing may be quite 
detached from the local reality. This second-guessing of risks becomes unhealthy judicial 
activism, which goes beyond the Court’s mandate as an arbiter, not a legislator. It also 
self-contradicts another interpretive stance in similar (risk-related) issues represented by 
in dubio mitius. All these problems tend to eventually undermine the Court’s legitimacy. 
 
In fact, this test is a digression from the Court’s previous laudable hermeneutics 
labeled the “chapeau test.” In earlier GATT Article XX cases, such as Gasoline and 
Shrimp-Turtle, the Court took the local regulatory autonomy seriously and deferred the 
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issue of whether the regulation was a legitimate exercise of its policy objective to a 
regulating country.194 Instead, it focused on the procedural aspects of the regulation, i.e., 
whether the measure was applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner stipulated in the 
introductory language of Article XX (chapeau). The Court breathed new life into this 
quite mundane language, which had been nearly dead letters before, and created a new 
procedural hermeneutics of regulatory cooperation and due process. Under the chapeau 
of Article XX regulating countries have to prove that they do take into account the 
interests of exporting countries which might be negatively affected by the former’s 
regulation,195 and that the regulation respected the due process principle in their legal 
system.196 
 
The chapeau test is a mature balance-striker between free trade values and 
regulatory autonomy (non-trade values) in that it highlights “how” a measure is applied, 
rather than “what” the measure really is. The Court should further develop this line of 
jurisprudence, rather than weighing and balancing regulatory details on its own discretion. 
If a regulating party demonstrates that it seriously engaged with negatively affected 
countries, such as exporting countries, through consultation and negotiation, the Court 
should decide that the regulating party has discharged its BOP under GATT Article XX, 
even if this engagement bore no substantial outcome.197 On the other hand, if the 
evidence showed that the regulating party refused to work with the exporting countries or 
responded to their inquiries in a dismissive manner, the Court should rule that the 
regulating party has not met its BOP under Article XX.  
 
In sum, the restoration of the chapeau test will encourage parties to engage in 
more regulatory dialogue and cooperation because this is what they should prove under 
GATT Article XX. Thus, this test envisions a “good and responsible government” which 
takes into account its trading partners’ interests in the era of interdependence and 
globalization.198 
 
2. Harmonization (SPS Article 3) 
 
In Hormones, the Court recognized the defending (regulating) parties’ right to 
depart from international standards and thus required complaining parties to prove that 
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such departure would lack scientific justification.199 However, this interpretation 
weakened the normative prominence of international standards by constructing the 
compliance with these standards as a mere option, not as an obligation, despite the 
explicit language under SPS Article 3.1 which requires members to base their sanitary 
measures on these standards.  
 
Under the SPS Agreement, the Codex standards explicitly referenced in Annex A 
are a reincarnation of science.200 These standards embody views of an epistemic 
community in a given sector as well as its professional accountability.201 They are a 
representative repository of scientific evidence, and therefore should not be taken lightly. 
Both the preamble and Article 3 attest that harmonization via international standards is 
one of the main objects and purposes of the SPS Agreement.202  
 
Therefore, the Court should take international standards more seriously. From 
this standpoint, Article 3.1 tends to create a procedural obligation to seriously engage in 
international standards, i.e., a good faith effort to adopt international standards. The 
Court should guide parties to focus on this procedural aspect in discharging their proof 
burdens as to Article 3.1-3.3. In particular, the Court should interpret that Articles 3.4 
and 5.8 inform Article 3.1-3.3. Article 3.4 requires members to engage in serious 
regulatory dialogue over international standards,203 and Article 5.8 mandates a regulating 
member departing international standards to respond to an exporting member’s 
inquiries.204  
 
Granted, international standards may not satisfy all the members. Yet, a regulating 
member departing from these standards may at least present its different views in a 
                                                 
199 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
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relevant forum, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, to persuade other members 
to modify these standards, if it truly means to respect the Article 3.4 requirement. Likewise, 
the regulating member should also fulfill the reason-giving requirement under Article 5.8. 
The Court should demand parties, whichever bear the BOP, to prove these aspects. If a 
regulating party forsakes international standards without performing these procedural 
obligations, it would be sufficient to create a presumption against scientific justification 
since under these circumstances the measure could be presumed to be a unilateral 
regulatory determination with no involvement with the scientific community.  
 
3. Risk Assessment (SPS Article 5.1) 
 
The Court should interpret that the reason-giving requirement under Article 5.8 
also informs Article 5.1. If a respondent fails to engage with a requesting country, this is 
tantamount to admitting that the requesting country, i.e., the potential complainant, has 
made a prima facie case since such failure generates a reasonable presumption that the 
respondent’s SPS measure was adopted without reasons which connote scientific 
justification.205  
 
Likewise, the Court may link procedural disciplines under Article 7 
(Transparency) as well as Annex B (Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Regulations) to the risk assessment requirement under Article 5.1. For example, if a 
complainant has requested to a defendant “the products to be covered by the regulation 
together with a brief indication of the objective and rationale of the proposed regulation”206 
but received no genuine responses, it could generate a presumption against the regulating 
Member (defendant)’s fulfillment of the risk assessment obligation. In other words, if the 
defendant has failed to present a proper justification for its SPS measure, one might raise 
a reasonable suspicion that such measure was adopted without necessary disciplines, such 
as risk assessment based on scientific evidence. Under these circumstances, an initial BOP 
borne to the complainant may be shifted to the defendant, which should now prove that 
it nonetheless performed risk assessment. Procedural flaws, such as the lack of due process 
or reason-giving, are often suggestive of substantive deficiencies, such as the lack of a 
substantial relationship between an alleged internal assessment and an adopted SPS 
measure. 
 
Suppose the regulating state (defendant) does respond to the inquiring state 
(complainant) with certain reasons and justification. If the inquiring state is satisfied with 
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such reason-giving, no further inquiry will follow, hence no dispute. If the inquiring state, 
still unsatisfied, raises further questions on scientific justification of the measure, the 
regulating state should also respond to these additional inquiries in good faith. This series 
of a question and answer process is likely to constitute a meaningful regulatory dialogue 
between the regulating and inquiring state. This regulatory dialogue tends to contribute 
to mitigating, if not eradicating, tensions which stem largely from ignorance and 
misinformation. This dialectical exchange of reason-demanding and reason-giving by 
parties concerned is a prerequisite for any regulatory cooperation since such dialogue 
creates certain room for each party to take into account the other’s interests and concerns. 
Even if such dialogue cannot entail regulatory cooperation and litigation finally ensues, 
the Court may use parties’ arguments and submissions as undisputed facts or at least 
circumstantial evidence which may assist the Court to discharge its own burden on the 
BOP.207  
 
4. Risk Management (SPS Article 5.5) 
 
In determining the appropriate level of protection under Article 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement, a regulating party must satisfy many requirements, such as minimizing any 
restrictive impact to trade and avoiding any arbitrary and unjustifiable distinction.208 In 
fact, these requirements can be translated into certain procedural duties. To minimize 
trade restriction under Article 5.4, a regulating party should reach out to its trading 
partners which may be affected by its regulation, such as exporting countries. In other 
words, this obligation tends to impose on the regulating state a certain procedural duty to 
cooperate with these exporting countries in consulting and negotiating over possible 
arrangements which can achieve both goals of regulatory protection and free trade.  
 
Likewise, to avoid any arbitrary and unjustifiable distinction in determining the 
appropriate level of protection under Article 5.5, the regulating country should 
investigate and re-investigate whether its SPS measure has been consistent with its 
hitherto regulatory practice in similar issues and whether it may generate other due 
process concerns. Naturally, the Court’s final decision on whether a regulating country 
has violated those SPS provisions may depend on whether the country has discharged its 
burden of proving that it has genuinely adhered to those procedural disciplines.  
 
According to this approach, the AB in Hormones should have interpreted that the 
EC should prove that it had adequately communicated with other affected parties, e.g., 
the United States, before it reached the conclusion that artificially-injected hormones 
were riskier than naturally-occurring hormones. It should not have unconditionally 
declared that such distinction is “fundamental” and any comparison between these two 
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regulatory situations is preposterous.209 Admittedly, the AB would still have found the 
EC’s total ban on hormoned beef to be legal under the SPS Agreement, yet for a different 
reason from the original one, i.e., a procedural, not substantive, reason. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The current way of discharging the Court’s burden of determining the BOP issues, 
such as who to prove, what to prove and whether to prove, risks illegitimating the Court 
by rendering transcendental answers in combustible risk-related disputes to parties which 
have already been entrenched with their own transcendental answers. As a solution, the 
Court should focus on procedural aspects of WTO obligations in this area so that it can 
encourage parties to seriously commit themselves to regulatory dialogue and cooperation.   
 
This rethinking of the Court’s role is not radical one if one acknowledges that the 
Court’s institutional responsibility is closer to a constitutional court than to a mundane 
civil court. The purpose of the Court lies not only in simply resolving disputes by picking 
the winner but also in constituting a legal (regulatory) community within the WTO system. 
While the Court’s hitherto incoherency in the BOP jurisprudence has exacerbated an 
adversarial struggle of parties and led to ever-lengthening reports, it has certainly failed to 
nurture a regularized pattern of regulatory discourse among parties concerned. After all, a 
real closure on any sensitive regulatory dispute with socio-cultural characteristics 
originates from parties themselves, not from the Court.  
 
The proceduralized hermeneutics proposed here tends to provide both parties with 
adequate incentives to facilitate regulatory dialogue and regulatory cooperation. An 
exporting country would like to proactively inquire of an importing country’s SPS 
measure with challenging scientific information which would help the former establish its 
prima facie case on risk assessment. Even if the importing country had eventually rejected 
the information, it would still have to register, for the record, other information 
counteracting the exporting country’s original information. This would in turn trigger yet 
another round of inquiries or regulatory dialogue. As their dialogue deepens, so becomes 
their level of mutual understanding. The exporting country might be persuaded by the 
importing country’s reason-giving and forsake the idea of a WTO litigation. Or, both 
parties might have reached a certain regulatory arrangement to resolve their disputes. In 
sum, this culture of proceduralism will eventually prevent disputes, rather than settle them. 
 
Notably, this strategy of legitimacy over closure seems prudent especially when a 
fact-finding mission of the Court is severely challenged by scientific uncertainty and 
disagreement on risks involved. As Lawrence Solum contends, BOP under these 
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circumstances should be allocated to achieve certain purposes, such as fairness.210 The 
Court’s hermeneutical refocusing on procedural disciplines not only enhances the 
legitimacy of its decision but also helps parties reach mutually acceptable regulatory 
settlement through continuing regulatory cooperation, which those procedural disciplines 
tend to provide. This procedural approach will also shelter the WTO from potential 
criticisms from interest groups, such as environmentalists and consumer advocates, since 
the Court could refrain from rendering any substantive answers.211 
 
In conclusion, the Court’s new hermeneutics proposed here212 will help parties 
change their way of engaging with each other in the global trading community.  
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